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ty                            PRINCETON,  N.  J.                          *^ 

Presented    by  Br.  F  L.TcaHon. 

BL    51    .C377    1881 
Carson,    W.    B. 
Essays 

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ESSAYS 


Cljeologg  antr  lljiloso^g. 


/ 

By  W.    B.    CARSON. 


ATLANTA,    GA. : 

JAS.   P.   HARRISON   &   CO.,   PUBLISHERS    AND    PRINTERS. 

I88l. 


on  iui|  JJrrlfyrsiu 

DR.   JAMES   S.   LAWTON,    REV.  JOHN    G.  WILLIAMS 
and    REV.  J.   M.   BOSTICK. 

lips  Tallinn;  is  Jtfcrttmmbty  Jnsrrifran, 

By  the  Author. 


FRTHF^OE. 


The  fourth  Essay  is  an  attempt  to  explore  a  field  hith- 
erto unattempted,  so  far  as  I  know. 

Should  any  one  think  it  worthy  of  criticism,  I  beg  that 
he  will  observe  the  following  order: 

i.  Say  definitely  that  the  list  of  possible  definitions  of 
free  agency  is  exhaustive,  or  that  it  is  not.  If  not,  please 
give  the  other  or  others. 

2.  If  the  list  be  admitted  to  be  exhaustive,  please  say 
of  each  that  its  reconciliation  with  the  Divine  Government 
over  us  is  complete,  or  that  it  is  not.  If  not,  please  point 
out  distinctly  the  missing  link  in  the  chain  of  reasoning; 

This  course  will  fairly  test  the  success  or  failure  of  the 
attempt. 

I  say  nothing  of  the  other  Essays. 

Should  the  style  be  thought  redundant,  I  have  sought 
completeness  rather  than  elegance. 


ESSAY  FIRST. 


"  Now  when  much  time  was  spent,  and  when  sailing  was  now  dangerous,  because  the 
last  was  now  already  past,  Paul  admonished  them,  and  said  unto  them,  Sirs,  I  perceive  that 
this  voyage  will  be  with  hurt  and  much  damage,  not  only  of  the  lading  and  ship,  but 
also  of  our  lives." — Acts  27  :  9,  10. 

"  There  shall  be  no  loss  of  any  man's  life  among  you." — 22. 

"  Except  these  abide  in  the  ship,  ye  cannot  be  saved. — 31. 

The  matters  contained  in   these  passages   of  Scripture 
have  not  only  afforded  abundant  scope  for  the  exercise  of 
the  ingenuity  of  metaphysicians  and  theologians,  but  have 
also  proved  serious  embarrassments  to  sincere  enquirers 
after  truth.     This   latter   I  know  from  the   most  painful 
personal  experience.     As  not  the  slightest  vestige  of  dif- 
ficulty now  rests  upon  my  own  mind,  I  shall  attempt  in 
thfcse  essays  to  lay  befqre  the  reader  the  solutions  which 
have  completely  satisfied  me.     But  even  if  my  solutions 
be  the  true   ones,  and  not  mere  sophisms,  with  which  ig- 
norance frequently  deludes  itself  and  attempts  to  satisfy 
others — even  if  the  mental  solutions  which  I  have  wrought 
out  be  correct,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  they  will 
satisfy  every,  or  even  any  other ;  for  it  is  one  thing  to  un- 
derstand a  subject,  and  quite  another  to  explain  it.     It  is 
one  thing  for  an   artist   to   form  a  clear  conception  of   a 
picture,  and  a  very  different  thing  to  reproduce  that  con- 
ception on  canvas,  so  that  it  shall  in  every  respect  appear 
to  the  eyes  of  the  beholder  as  it  did  to  his  own  mind's  eye. 
The  success  or  failure  of  the  present  attempt  must  be  left 
to  the  judgment  of  the  reader. 
Three  ideas  are  here  presented  : 

1st.  There  was  danger  of  the  destruction  of  the  lives  of 
all  on  board. 


8  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

2d.  There  was  positive  certainty  that  they  should  all  be 
saved. 

3d.  Their  salvation  was  contingent,  dependent  on  the 
sailors  remaining  in  the  ship  or  leaving  it. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  these  separately,  before  at- 
tempting a  reconciliation  of  them. 

1st.  It  is  worth  while  to  enquire  carefully  what  danger 
is.  I  am  confident  of  showing  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  danger,  external  to  the  mind.  We  are  so  much  accus- 
tomed to  think  and  speak  of  danger  as  an  objective  reality, 
existing  in  external  things,  that  it  may  to  some  seem 
strange,  or  even  absurd,  to  say  that  it  is  simply  a  state  of 
the  mind,  an  incertitude  depending  for  its  very  existence 
on  the  ignorance  of  him  who  entertains  it,  and  from  the 
mind  unconsciously  transferred  to  outward  things,  and 
made  to  appear  to  be  an  external  reality.  Yet,  I  think,  the 
following  illustrations  will  fully  satisfy  the  thoughtful 
reader  that  such  is  the  case. 

Suppose  one  sees  a  cannon  ball  (I  believe  they  are  visi- 
ble in  the  latter  part  of  their  flight)  moving  directlyto- 
ward  a  man  who  is  bound  so  that  he  cannot  possibly 
move  :  he  would  not  say  there  is  danger,  but  positive  cer- 
tainty, of  his  death.  Neither  would  he  say  there  is  danger 
of  one's  being  shot  whom  he  sees  walking  at  liberty,  no 
gun  being  visible.  But  if  he  sees  a  cannon  about  to  be 
fired  toward  one  at  the  distance  of  half  a  mile,  the  word 
danger  will  exactly  express  the  beholder's  idea  of  the 
other's  condition.  Again,  if  we  see  a  vehicle  standing  on 
a  perfect  level,  we  should  not  say  there  is  danger  of  its 
upsetting.  Nor,  if  we  see  it  on  a  slope  almost  perpendic- 
ular, should  we  express  our  idea  of  its  condition  by  saying 
there  is  danger  of  its  overturning  when  the  support  is  re- 
moved, but  positive  certainty.  But  if  we  see  it  approach- 
ing a  plane  of  forty-five  degrees,  the  word  danger  ex. 
actly  expresses    the  idea  we  should  have  concerning  it. 

In  this  last  case,  there  is  manifestly  as  much  certainty 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  9 

of  its  standing  or  falling,  so  far  as  the  event  itself  is  con- 
cerned, as  in  either  of  the  others  ;  for  it  is  absolutely  cer- 
tain that  if  so  much  as  one  ounce  of  weight  fall  beyond 
the  base  more  than  within  it,  the  greater  weight  must 
•overbear  the  smaller,  and  the  vehicle  must  fall.  And  if 
the  smallest  imaginable  excess  of  weight  fall  within  the 
base,  it  is  impossible  for  the  smaller  weight  to  overbalance 
the  greater.  Why,  then,  do  we  say  there  is  danger  in 
this  case,  but  not  in  either  of  the  others,  if  the  event  of 
falling  or  standing  is  as  certain  as  in  either  of  the  other 
instances?  In  the  first  case,  the  force  which  tends  to 
keep  it  steady  so  manifestly  predominates  as  to  leave 
no  doubt  in  the  mind  that  it  must  stand.  In  the  sec- 
ond, the  power  tending  to  overturn  it  is  so  far  superior 
that  we  have  no  hesitation  in  deciding  that  it  must 
prevail.  In  the  third  case,  the  forces  are  so  nearly  bal- 
anced that  it  is  impossible  to  decide  by  the  eye  which  will 
predominate.  And  we  express  this  uncertainty,  ignorance, 
or  hesitation,  by  the  word  danger,  provided  the  event  be 
undesirable:  for  the  word  danger  is  not  properly  applica- 
ble to  an  event  which  is  desirable  or  indifferent,  even 
though  we  may  be  quite  ignorant  as  to  whether  it  will 
occur  or  not. 

This  is  the  definition  of  danger;  and  it  is  very  evident 
that  there  was  danger,  as  here  explained,  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  lives  of  all  in  the  ship.  Paul  does  not  speak 
with  absolute  certainty  as  to  the  event  of  their  destruc- 
tion. The  word  in  the  original  is  thcorcs,  from  which 
comes  our  word  theory.  It  means  to  see,  to  contemplate, 
to  consider,  and  then  to  theorise.  Paul  was  inspired,  and 
therefore  infallibly  preserved  from  error  in  what  he  wrote 
as  a  part  of  the  oracles  of  God.  But  his  inspiration  did 
not  make  him  infallible  on  all  subjects.  There  were  many 
things  which  he  did  not  know,  and  about  which  he  could 
only  theorise,  form  an  opinion,  by  the  use  of  his  natural 
faculties  acting  upon  the  information  he  had  received  in 


IO  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  ordinary  way.  And  from  the  accounts  we  have,  both 
ancient  and  modern,  of  the  weather  at  that  season  and  in 
that  part  of  the  Mediterranean  sea,  any  one  would  sup- 
pose, or  theorise  that  the  probabilities  were  very  much 
against  a  safe  voyage. 

2d.  The  second  idea  is,  that  there  was  positive  certainty 
of  the  salvation  of  their  lives.  It  will  not  be  difficult  to' 
show  that  an  event  which  lies  in  the  future  is  not  less 
certain  in  itself  than  one  which  is  past.  It  is  a  first 
principle,  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause.  But  the 
connection  is  not  more  certain  when  thus  traced  backward 
from  effect  to  cause  than  when  traced  forward  from  cause 
to  effect.  It  is  no  more  certain  that  every  effect  must  have 
a  cause  than  that  every  cause  must  produce  an  effect. 
Nor  is  it  more  certain  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause 
adequate  to  its  production,  than  that  every  cause  must 
produce  the  effect  to  whose  production  it  is  adequate.  If  it 
be  certain  that  every  natural  event  springs  from  something 
that  preceded  it,  and  that  from  another  precedent,  running 
back  to  the  beginning  of  nature,  it  is  no  less  so  that  the 
chain  will  be  continued,  each  producing  the  exact  event 
to  whose  production  it  is  adequate,  until  the  present  con- 
stitution of  nature  is  abrogated,  partly  or  wholly.  I  say 
partly,  because  a  particular  series  of  events,  each  one  of 
which  occupies  successively  the  place  of  cause  and  effect, 
may  be  arrested  without  arresting  the  whole  course  of 
nature.  If  it  be  admitted  that  the  chain  binding  cause 
and  effect  together  is  as  strong  when  traced  forward  as 
backward,  the  admission  implies  that  every  event  to 
which  the  present  course  of  nature  is  adequate,  whether 
it  be  near  or  millions  of  years  in  the  future,  is  as  certain  as 
those  that  have  already  occurred,  with  the  single  pro- 
viso :  if  the  present  course  of  nature  be  not  annulled  nor 
in  any  manner  or  degree  modified  until  it  has  had  time  to 
produce  that  event. 

I  suppose  it  will  be  admitted  that  none  but  the  power 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  II 

that  enacted  these  laws  can  modify,  suspend,  or  annul 
them.  I  think  it  may  also  be  assumed  that  the  divine 
Mind  has  determined  when  the  present  course  of  nature 
is  to  be  arrested.  It  follows  from  all  this,  that  every 
event,  for  which  provision  is  made  in  the  present  consti- 
tution of  nature,  is  as  certain  as  those  which  have  already 
happened. 

Our  knowledge  of  them  is,  in  most  cases,  far  less  certain 
than  of  the  past.  That  of  past  events  usually  depends 
upon  human  testimony,  the  observation  of  the  effects  that 
they  have  left,  as  lava  testifies  to  the  former  existence  of 
volcanoes  now  extinct ;  or  upon  some  kind  of  evidence 
which  is  comparatively  simple  ;  while  our  knowledge  of 
the  future  depends  wholly  upon  our  knowledge  of  the 
laws  of  nature  (except  what  Revelation  gives  us),  which, 
notwithstanding  all  our  boasted  progress,  is  as  yet  very 
limited.  We  know  enough  of  the  laws  of  nature  to 
say  with  absolute  certainty,  the  forementioned  proviso 
being  made,  when  the  sun  will  rise  and  when  the  moon 
will  be  eclipsed.  But  the  most  learned  men  admit  that 
they  do  not  know  enough  of  these  laws  to  give  so  much 
as  a  probable  conjecture  concerning  the  weather  at  a  given 
time  and  place.  Dr.  Lardner  says :  "  The  causes  which 
govern  the  phenomena  of  weather  being  physical  agencies 
independent  of  the  will  or  interference  of  any  being  save 
of  Him  who  'rules  the  storm,'  are  as  fixed  and  certain  in 
their  operation,  and  as  regular  in  the  production  of  their 
effects,  as  those  which  maintain  and  regulate  the  motions 
of  the  solar  system.  The  moment  of  the  rising  or  setting 
of  the  sun  on  any  given  day  of  the  ensuing  year  is  there- 
fore, in  the  nature  of  things,  not  more  certain  than  the 
atmospheric  phenomena  that  will  take  place  on  that  day. 
The  doubt  and  uncertainty  which  attend  these  events 
belong  altogether  to  our  anticipation  of  them,  and  not  to 
the  things  themselves.  If  our  knowledge  of  meteorology 
were    as  advanced  as  our  knowledge  of  astronomy,  we 


12  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

should  be  in  a  condition  to  declare  the  time,  duration, 
and  intensity  of  every  shower  which  shall  fall  during  the 
ensuing  year,  with  as  much  certainty  and  precision  as  we 
are  able  to  foretell  the  rising,  setting,  or  southing  of  the 
sun  and  moon,  or  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  tides  of  the 
ocean.  When  it  is  said,  therefore,  that  drought  or  rain  is 
expected  to  predominate,  the  doubt  or  uncertainty  implied 
in  the  term  expected  must  be  understood  to  belong  to  the 
knowledge,  or  rather  ignorance,  of  him  who  makes  the 
prediction,  and  not  to  the  event,  which,  as  we  have  shown, 
is  necessary  and  not  contingent '." — Lee.  on  Science  and  Art, 
vol.  i.  pp.  161-2. 

What  is  here  said  of  the  weather  may  be  generalized 
and  applied  to  every  event  that  happens  in  the  course  of 
nature. 

Nor  do  those  which  are  dependent  on  human  agency 
form  an  exception  to  what  is  here  asserted.  The  laws 
which  govern  the  mind  of  man  are  far  more  subtle  and 
more  difficult  to  understand  thoroughly  than  even  those 
which  govern  the  meteorological  phenomena.  But  our 
non-comprehension  of  them  no  more  proves  their  non-ex- 
istence than  our  ignorance  of  the  laws  that  govern  the 
weather  proves  that  there  are  no  such  laws,  and  that  rain 
falls  and  ceases  without  a  cause ;  or  than  the  former  igno- 
rance of  the  laws  of  astronomy  proved  that  the  planets 
were  moved  by  wild  caprice  instead  of  being  governed  as 
a  system  by  immutable  laws.  But  we  are  not  only  without 
negative  evidence  against  the  government  of  mind  by 
certain  laws,  but  we  have  positive  and  certain  evidence 
that  it  is  so  governed. 

1.  We  act  upon  the  supposition,  not  only  that  there  are 
such  laws,  but  that  we,  to  some  extent,  understand  them, 
whenever  we  appeal  to  the  hopes  or  fears,  prejudices  or 
interests  of  our  fellow-beings.  Indeed,  our  whole  inter- 
course with  each  other  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that 
there  are  mental  laws  controlling  mental  phenomena,  such 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  1 3 

as  volitions,  etc.,  as  well  as  physical  laws  governing  the 
material  universe.  And  if  it  be  said  that  the  result  often 
proves  the  supposition  false,  I  answer,  the  same  thing 
often  occurs  in  regard  to  physical  phenomena ;  e.  g.,  how 
often  d^es  the  husbandman  find  himself  deceived  in  regard 
to  rain?  In  the  latter,  as  in  the  former  case,  the  disap- 
pointment proves,  the  falsehood  not  of  the  supposition 
that  there  are  laws,  but  of  the  supposition  that  we  under- 
stand them.  Although  we  are  often  mistaken  in  our  sup- 
posed knowledge  of  those  laws,  we  have  nothing  for  it 
but  to  learn  wisdom  from  experience  and  act  again  on 
the  same  supposition :  for  the  business  of  life  can  not  pos- 
sibly go  on  without  it. 

2.  Prophecy  affords  a  palpable  demonstration  of  their 
existence.  Observe,  the  prophecies  are  not  conjectures 
as  to  what  will  probably  happen,  but  the  utterances  of 
positive  knowledge  as  to  what  cvill  certainly  happen. 
(This  argument  is  addressed  only  to  those  who  believe  in 
the  inspiration  of  the  Bible.  To  one  who  does  not,  it  has 
no  force.)  Knowledge  is  the  apprehension  of  truth  by 
the  mind.  If,  then,  the  supposed  truth  have  not  an  abso- 
lutely certain  objective  existence,  there  can  be  no  knowl- 
edge of  it,  although  there  may  be  conjecture.  If,  then,  the 
prophets,  or  He  by  whose  moving  they  spake,  had  abso- 
lute knowledge  that  certain  events  would  happen,  it  must 
have  been  absolutely  certain  that  they  would  happen. 

Let  us  now  ask  what  it  is  that  can  give  absolute  cer- 
tainty to  a  future  event  ?     There  are  two  things  : 

First,  the  simple  determination  of  God  that  it  shall 
come  to  pass.  It  was  certain  from  eternity  that  the  uni- 
verse would  come  into  existence,  because  He  had  so  deter- 
mined. The  immutability  of  His  will,  and  the  omnipo- 
tence of  His  power,  wrere  a  cause  adequate  to  the  produc- 
tion of  the  event,  and  therefore  made  it  absolutely  certain. 
It  should  be  observed  that  in  this  case  the  event  is  caused 
by  a  direct  exertion  of  the  power  of  God. 


14  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

Secondly,  the  tendency  of  the  course  of  nature.  Before 
the  certainty  becomes  absolute,  however,  we  must  add. 
the  determination  of  God  not  to  change  the  present  ten- 
dency of  things  until  the  given  event  shall  have  oc- 
curred. What  the  change  of  the  moon  lacks  of  absolute 
certainty  is  the  condition,  if  the  present  course  of  nature 
be  sustained  until  the  given  time.  The  determination  of 
God  to  sustain  it  removes  that  condition,  and  so  renders 
it  absolutely  certain.  If  it  be  said  that  these  two  may  be 
run  up  into  one,  viz  :  the  determination  of  God,  I  answer, 
still  the  distinction  is  real  and  important,  as  in  the  one 
case  He  acts  directly  and  in  the  other  indirectly.  The 
latter  is  the  execution  of  established  law.  The  other  is 
action  in  the  absence  of  all  law,  or,  if  need  be,  in  defiance 
of  existing  law. 

Now,  if  the  future  events  that  depend  on  human  agency 
are  certain,  they  must  be  made  so  by  one  or  the  other  of 
these  causes.  But  I  suppose  very  few  will  say  that  God 
determines  to  compel  men  to  do  certain  acts  without  re- 
gard to  their  own  inclination,  and  least  of  all,  those  who 
object  to  the  mind's  being  governed  by  immutable  laws, 
through  fear  of  infringing  upon  free  agency.  If  He  makes 
men  act,  as  He  made  the  world  come  into  existence,  by  a 
direct  exertion  of  His  almighty  power,  this  is  an  annihila- 
tion of  free  agency,  whatever  definition  of  it  we  may 
adopt.  And  since  all  admit  the  existence  of  free  agency 
as  an  unquestionable  fact,  witnessed  by  consciousness  as 
a  simple  deliverance,  it  follows  that  the  certainty  of  future 
events  which  are  to  be  performed  by  human  agency  must 
rest  upon  the  certain  and  uniform  operation  of  the  laws 
governing  the  human  mind,  just  as  the  certainty  of  an 
eclipse  of  the  moon  rests  upon  the  certainty  of  the  phys- 
ical laws  that  move  the  earth  and  the  moon,  that  regulate 
the  direction  and  velocity  of  light,  etc. 

Is  there  a  third  thing  supposable  which  can  give  cer- 
tainty  to  a  future  event  ?  I  think  not.  If  not,  then  three 
things  are  before  us  : 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY.  I  5 

First,  the  denial  that  there  is  any  certainty  of  events 
that  are  dependent  on  human  agency  until  they  have  actu- 
ally occurred.  And  this  involves  the  denial  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  foreknowledge  as  to  human  action ;  for  that 
which  is  not  certain  in  itself  cannot  be  the  object  of  cer- 
tain knowledge.  And  this,  again,  involves  the  denial  of 
the  possibility  of  prophecy :  for  prophecy  is  but  the  utter- 
ance of  the  positive  knowledge  of  a  future  event.  But 
since  most  of  the  prophecies  were  predictions  of  human 
actions,  the  denial  of  certainty  as  to  these  involves  a  plain, 
unequivocal  denial  of  a  large  and  important  part  of  the 
Bible.  And  more  than  this,  the  denial  is  contradicted  by 
fact:  for  some  of  the  prophecies  have  been  fulfilled  so  ex- 
actly as  to  leave  no  doubt  that  the  events  were  the  sub- 
jects of  positive  knowledge  with  the  prophets.  If  it  be 
admitted  that  human  actions  are  certain,  then, 

Secondly,  we  must  assume  that  the  certainty  rests  upon 
the  simule  determination  of  God  that  they  shall  be  done, 
without  any  regard  to  the  inclination  or  circumstances  of 
the  actors.  But  this  would  be  a  direct  renunciation  of 
free  agency  in  every  sense  of  the  phrase,  not  only  of  that 
free  agency  contended  for  by  those  who  hold  to  the  self- 
determining  power  of  the  will,  but  of  what  is  called  free 
agency  by  those  who  hold  that  the  will  is  governed  by 
motives.  This  view,  I  suppose,  will  not  be  held  by  any 
one.     If  not,  then, 

Thirdly,  we  must  admit  that  human  actions  are  made 
certain  by  the  tendency  of  the  laws  which  govern  the 
human  mind.  Hence,  whoever  admits  the  reality,  or  even 
the  possibility,  of  prophecy  as  to  human  actions,  must 
admit  the  reality  or  possibility  of  fore-knowledge  as  to 
those  actions.  And  whoever  admits  the  possibility  of 
fore-knowledge  as  to  human  actions  must  admit  the  cer- 
tainty of  those  actions;  and  whoever  admits  the  certainty 
of  those  actions  must  admit  that  they  are  made  certain, 
.either  by  the  determination  of  God  to  cause  them,  or  by 


1 6  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  tendencies  of  the  laws  of  the  human  mind.  And 
whoever  will  not  adopt  the  first  of  these  grounds  of  cer- 
tainty must  adopt  the  second,  that  is,  that  the  human 
mind  is  governed  by  immutable  laws. 

Unless  I  am  wholly  mistaken,  the  admission  of  prophecy 
as  either  actual  or  possible,  inevitably  involves  the  admis- 
sion that  the  human  mind  is  governed  by  laws  that  are  as 
certain  in  their  operation  as  those  of  matter. 

3.  The  same  may  be  shown  by  the  admission  of  the 
providence  of  God.  There  are,  so  far  at  least  as  is 
known  to  us,  but  two  ways  in  which  God  acts,  viz  :  the 
providential  and  the  miraculous.  (See  Ess.  on  Prov.)  If 
"  He  doeth  according  to  His  pleasure  in  the  army  of 
heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth,"  it  must 
be  in  one  of  these  two  ways.  Now,  if  every  human  mind 
is  an  absolutely  independent  kingdom,  subject  to  no  law, 
an  absolutely  originating  centre  of  actions  which  have  no 
connection  with  anything  beyond  the  mind,  then  the  only 
manner  in  which  God  can  control  these  actions  is  the  mi- 
raculous. But  that  God  rules  us  as  an  absolute,  and  not 
as  a  constitutional  monarch,  is  contrary  both  to  Scrip- 
ture and  to  our  own  experience.  And  this  will,  of  course, 
not  be  assumed  by  those  who  contend  for  the  self-acting 
and  self-determining  power  of  the  will.  That  God,  by  the 
direct  exertion  of  His  almighty  power,  compels  men  to  do 
whatever  they  do,  will  scarcely  be  asserted  by  any.  If  not^ 
then  there  is  no  other  manner  in  which  He  can  control 
them  except  the  providential,  that  is,  by  the  regular  ad- 
ministration of  the  laws  of  the  mind. 

Three  things  are  before  us :  First,  we  must  deny  that 
God  governs  at  all  among  men.  Secondly,  we  must  admit- 
that  He  does  so  directly  and  miraculously.  Thirdly,  we 
must  admit  that  He  governs  providentially,  that  is  by  the 
regular  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  human  mind.  And 
to  admit  that  God  governs  according  to,  and  by  the  ad- 
ministration of,  laws,  is  to  admit  that  the  mind  is  subject 
to  laws. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY.  1 7 

It  thus  appears  evident  that  we  cannot  consistently 
deny  that  the  human  mind  is  subject  to  laws,  without 
denying  both  the  doctrines  of  prophecy  and   providence. 

4.  The  proposition  :  The  human  mind  is  governed  by 
laws,  seems  to  me  to  be  included  under  the  more  general 
self-evident  proposition  :  Every  being  must  have  a  nature. 
We  say  a  thing  does  so  or  so,  or  remains  quiescent,  be- 
cause it  is  its  nature,  nature  being  the  name  of  the  com- 
plement of  those  qualities,  or  tendencies,  or  propensities, 
which  make  or  constitute  a  thing  what  it  is.  When  we 
call  these  laws,  we  are  not  to  understand  that  they  are 
rules  by  which  some  other  being  governs  things,  but  prop- 
erties of  their  own  nature,  causing  them  to  act,  to  rest,  or 
to  exist  thus  and  so.  For  example,  when  we  say  it  is  a 
law  of  brass  to  expand  twice  as  much  as  steel  when 
heated,  the  meaning  is,  not  that  something  else  requires 
it  thus  to  expand,  nor  that  heat  acts  differently  upon  the 
two,  but  that  some  quality  in  the  brass  inclines  it  to  ex- 
pand thus. 

It  is  easy,  in  thought,  to  deny  that  a  given  being  has  a 
given  nature,  just  as  we  may  deny  that  a  certain  body  has 
a  given  figure,  or  that  it  is  in  this  or  that  place,  or  that  it 
existed  at  a  particular  time.  But  the  denial  that  a  body 
has  any  figure,  is  in  any  place,  or  existed  at  any  time,  is  a 
denial  of  its  existence  :  for  it  is  self-evidently  necessary 
that  bodies  must  have  some  form,  and  be  included  in  time 
and  space.  So  we  may  deny  that  a  given  being  has  this 
or  that  nature.  But  to  deny  that  it  has  any  nature  at  all, 
is  equivalent  to  denying  its  existence  :  for  it  is  self-evi- 
dent that  every  being  must  have  a  nature,  that  is,  laws 
of  action,  or  of  rest,  or  of  existence.  The  axiom,  every 
being  must  have  a  nature,  being  self-evident,  neither 
needs  nor  admits  a  demonstration,  and  being  universal, 
includes  minds  as  well  as  physical  or  material  beings. 
When  a  mind  performs  any  action,  a  judgment,  volition, 
or  whatever,  the  question,  why  did  it  act  thus   and   not 

2 


1 8  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

otherwise?  is  legitimate;  and  the  only  answer  is,  it  is  its 
nature  to  act  so  under  the  circumstances,  and  that  like 
all  other  beings  it  must  obey  the  laws  of  its  own  nature. 
That  nature,  or  those  laws  which  in  their  totality  make 
up  its  nature,  and  the  circumstances  in  which  it  was  placed, 
taken  all  together,  constitute  a  sufficient  reason  why  the 
act  should  have  been  done. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton,  speaking  of  the  mental  laws  with 
which  logic  is  conversant,  says  :  "When  I  speak  of  laws, 
and  of  their  absolute  necessity  in  relation  to  thought,  you 
must  not  suppose  that  these  laws  and  that  necessity  are 
the  same  in  the  world  of  mind  as  in  the  world  of  matter. 
For  free  intelligences,  a  law  is  an  ideal  necessity  given  in 
the  form  of  a  precept,  which  we  ought  to  follow,  but 
which  we  may  also  violate  if  we  please  ;  whereas,  for  the 
existences  which  constitute  the  universe  of  nature,  a  law 
is  only  another  name  for  those  causes  which  operate 
blindly  and  universally  in  producing  certain  and  inevitable 
results.  By  law  of  thought,  or  by  logical  necessity,  we  do 
not,  therefore,  mean  a  physical  law,  such  as  the  law  of 
gravitation,  but  a  general  precept  which  we  are  able  cer- 
tainly to  violate,  but  which  if  we  do  not  obey,  our  whole 
process  of  thinking  is  suicidal,  or  absolutely  null." — Logic, 
p.  56. 

But  he  has  said,  p.  10:  "These  objects  are  the  rude 
materials  submitted  to  elaboration  by  a  higher  and  self- 
active  faculty,  which  operates  upon  them  in  obedience  to 
certain  laws."  And  on  p.  33  he  quotes  from  Heinrich 
Richter,  not  only  without  any  intimation  of  dissent,  but 
with  manifest  approval,  the  following:  "  It  is  true,  indeed, 
that  the  mind  of  man  is,  like  the  universe  of  matter,  gov- 
erned by  eternal  laws,  and  follows,  even  without  conscious- 
ness, the  invariable  canons  of  its  nature." 

Which  of  these  is  right  ?  "  The  whole  is  greater  than 
any  of  its  parts."  Is  this  a  mere  precept  which  we  can 
obey  or  disobey  at  pleasure  ?     Are  we  able  to  think  or  con- 


ESSA.YS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  I  9 

ceive  a  part  equal  to,  or  greater  than,  the  whole  to  which 
it  belongs  ?  "  If  the  premises  of  a  syllogism  be  conceived 
as  true,  the  conclusion  must."  Can  any  one  conceive  the 
premises  true  and  the  conclusion  false?  What  he  here 
says  of  the  laws  of  thought  is  true  of  the  moral  law  in  one 
of  its  constituent  elements,  (see  Essay  on  the  Moral  Law) 
but  it  is  by  no  means  true  of  the  laws  of  thought. 

Again  he  says,  p.  57 :  "  The  principle  of  Identity  (prin- 
cipium  Identitatis)  expresses  the  relation  of  total  sameness 
in  which  a  concept  stands  to  all,  and  the  relation  of  partial 
sameness  in  which  it  stands  to  each  of  its  constituent 
characters.  In  other  words,  it  declares  the  impossibility 
of  thinking  a  concept  and  its  characters  as  reciprocally 
unlike."  Is  this,  too,  a  mere  "  precept  which  we  ought  to 
follow  ?"     Or  does  it  truly  "  declare  the  impossibility"  etc.  ? 

The  following  is  still  more  explicit:  "Now,  when  we 
say  that  Logic  is  the  science  of  the  necessary  forms  of 
thought,  what  does  the  quality  of  necessity  here  imply?" 

'  In  the  first  place,  it  is  evident  that  in  so  far  as  a  form  of 
thought  is  necessary,  this  form  must  be  determined  or 
necessitated  by  the  nature  of  the  thinking  subject  itself; 
for  if  it  were  determined  by  anything  external  to  the 
mind,  then  would  it  not  be  a  necessary,  but  a  merely  con- 
tingent, determination.  The  first  condition,  therefore,  of 
the  necessity  of  a  form  of  thought  is,  that  it  is  subjectively, 
not  objectively,  determined. 

'  In  the  second  place,  if  a  form  of  thought  be  subjectively 
necessary,  it  must  be  original,  and  not  acquired.  For  if  it 
were  acquired,  there  must  have  been  a  time  when  it  did 
not  exist ;  but  if  it  did  ever  actually  not  exist,  we  must  be 
able  at  least  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  its  not  existing 
now.  But  if  we  are  so  able,  then  is  the  form  not  neces- 
sary ;  for  the  criterion  of  a  contingent  cognition  is,  that  we 
can  represent  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  its  non-existence. 
The  second  condition,  therefore,  of  the  necessity  of  a  form 
of  thought,  is,  that  it  is  original,  and  not  acquired. 


20  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

'  In  the  third  place,  if  a  form  of  thought  be  necessary 
and  original,  it  must  be  universal ;  that  is,  it  cannot  be 
that  it  necessitates  on  some  occasions,  and  does  not  neces- 
sitate on  others.  For  if  it  did  not  necessitate  universally, 
then  would  its  necessitation  be  contingent,  and  it  would 
consequently  not  be  an  original  and  necessary  principle  of 
mind.  The  third  condition,  therefore,  of  the  necessity  of 
a  form  of  thought  is,  that  it  is  universal. 

'  In  the  fourth  place,  if  a  form  of  thought  be  necessary 
and  universal,  it  must  be  a  law  ;  for  a  law  is  that  which 
applies  to  all  cases  without  exception,  and  from  which  a 
deviation  is  ever  and  everywhere  impossible,  or,  at  least, 
unallowed.  The  fourth  and  last  condition,  therefore,  of 
the  necessity  of  a  form  of  thought  is,  that  it  is  a  law.' ' 
Logic,  pp.  17,  18.  The  editors  tell  us  that  the  quotation  is 
from  Esser's  Logik,  "with  a  few  original  interpolations:" 
italics  are  mine. 

This  modification  of  the  fourth  condition,  as  being  that 
"from  which  a  deviation  is  ever  and  everywhere  impossi- 
ble, or,  at  least,  unallowed"  is  unworthy  of  the  author, 
and  still  more  so  of  its  illustrious  endorser.  If  it  be 
simply  "  unallowed,"  and  not  "  impossible,"  then  it  is,  ac- 
cording to  their  own  criterion,  contingent,  and  not  neces- 
sary ;  for  if  a  deviation  from  the  form  be  possible,  then, 
when  the  deviation  actually  occurs,  the  identical  form  no 
longer  exists.  And  if  the  form  itself  may  cease  to  exist, 
we  may  certainly  conceive  it  as  non-existent ;  which  is 
nothing  else  than  saying  that  it  is  contingent:  "for  the 
criterion  of  a  contingent  cognition  is,  that  we  can  repre- 
sent to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  its  non-existence."  If 
such  be  the  criterion  of  contingency,  as  opposed  to  neces- 
sity, and  if  "  by  law  of  thought,  or  by  logical  necessity,  we 
mean  a  general  precept  which  we  are  able  certainly  to 
violate,"  then  is  logical  necessity  itself  contingent,  and  the 
Jaws  of  thought  are  necessary  in  no  other  sense  than 
needful.     But  Esser  certainly  teaches  that  there  are  forms 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

of  thought  which  are  neeessary  as  contra-distinguished  from 
contingent,  and  as  distinguishable  by  the  "  criterion  that 
we  cannot  represent  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  their 
non-existence;"  and  Hamilton,  by  incorporating  the  quo- 
tation into  his  lectures,  without  dissenting,  endorses  the 
doctrine.  There  is,  then,  according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
himself,  a  necessity  regulating  the  forms  of  thought,  to- 
tally different  from  mere  precepts  which  we  can  obey  or 
disobey,  and  which  may,  without  impropriety,  be  called 
absolute. 

It  is  thus  manifest  that  human  minds  are  not  outlaws 
in  the  universe,  as  comets  were  once  thought  to  be  in  the 
solar  system,  but  law-abiding  citizens,  as  truly  so  as  ma- 
terial substances. 

It  thus  seems  to  me  perfectly  clear  that  the  whole  uni- 
verse is,  in  the  strictest  sense,  a  system,- — that  as  "  no  man 
liveth  unto  himself,"  so  no  event  happens  isolated  from 
those  of  the  past  and  those  of  the  future ;  but  that  the 
present  is  the  result  of  the  past,  and  that  the  future  lies 
imbedded  in  the  present,  as  the  plant  in  the  seed. 

If  all  this  be  so,  it  is  evident  that  if  any  one  perfectly 
understood  all  the  laws  of  the  universe,  he  could  tell  all 
that  had  been,  or  all  that  would  be,  with  the  same  un- 
erring certainty  that  an  accurate  mathematician  resolves 
the  relations  of  certain  figures,  which  those  who  are  not 
so  well  versed  in  the  science  cannot  comprehend  without 
actually  putting  them  together. 

Before  passing  on  I  will  state,  in  order  to  avoid  the  pos- 
sibility of  misconception,  that  when  I  say  that  the  whole 
universe,  as  included  in  space  and  duration,  both  be- 
ings and  events,  or  existences  and  phenomena,  whatever, 
wherever  and  whenever,  is  bound  together  by  the  chain  of 
cause  and  effect,  it  is  not  meant  that  the  "  One  Law  Giver  " 
is  Himself  at  all  dependent  on  the  laws  of  His  enacting, 
that  He  may  not  at  any  time  or  place  produce  a  single 
event  or  a  single  being  by  the  immediate  putting  forth  of 


22  '  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

His  energy,  or  if  He  so  choose,  establish  a  new  series  of 
events,  occupying  toward  each  other  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect.  It  is  not  meant,  I  say,  to  deny  that  God  may 
produce  beings'  or  events,  singly  or  connectedly,  for  which 
no  provision  is  made  in  the  present  course  of  nature.  Nor 
do  I  mean,  on  the  other  hand,  to  assert  that  He  is  bound 
by  the  laws  which  He  has  enacted,  so  as  not  to  be  able  to 
intervene  and  hinder  any  event  that  would  be  prodnced 
by  the  regular  operation  of  natural  laws.  There  is,  rather, 
reason  to  believe  that  His  power  is  as  necessary  to  the 
execution  of  His  laws  as  to  their  enactment.  I  believe  it 
is  President  Edwards  who  illustrates  the  constant  depen- 
dence of  the  universe  upon  its  Creator  by  that  of  an  image 
in  a  mirror  upon  the  person.  The  same  presence  that 
placed  it  there  must  sustain  it.  And  so,  perhaps,  or  prob- 
ably, the  laws  of  nature  are  no  more  self-acting  than  the 
image  is  self-supporting.  As  in  the  one  case  no  effacing 
act  is  necessary  to  remove  the  image,  but  a  mere  with- 
drawal of  the  presence  which  placed  it  there,  so  God  not 
only  has  the  power  to  prevent  an  event  for  which  provi- 
sion is  made  in  nature,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  mere 
withdrawal  of  His  power  would  reduce  the  universe  to 
chaos,  or  perhaps  annihilation.  But  perhaps  we  are  not 
competent  to  treat  of  a  subject  so  totally  different  from 
anything  that  ever  has  happened  within  our  knowledge  as 
the  removal  of  God's  sustaining  power,  by  which  "all 
things  consist,"  stand  together,  and  keep  their  places  in  the 
system.  When  I  speak  of  the  universe  as  being  bound 
inseparably  together,— that  whatever  events  are  hereafter 
to  happen  are  to  spring  from  causes  now  at  work,  I  speak 
with  this  limitation :  unless  God  see  fit  to  produce  them 
by  the  direct  exertion  of  His  power,  or  by  enacting  new 
laws  and  starting  new  series.  And  conversely,  when  I  say 
that  whatever  is  provided  for  in  the  present  will  certainly 
and  necessarily  happen,  the  assertion  must  be  understood 
with  the  proviso  :  unless  God  arrest  the  present  course  of 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY.  23 

nature  before  the  time  when  it  would  produce  the  given 
event. 

I  think  it  is  now  sufficiently  evident  that  if  any  one 
were  perfectly  acquainted  with  all  the  laws  of  nature,  he 
could  predict  every  event  which  will  ever  come  to  pass  in 
the  present  order  of  nature,  with  as  much  certainty  as  the 
astronomer  predicts  an  eclipse.  But  if  his  knowledge  ex- 
tended no  further  than  the  laws  of  nature,  material  and 
mental,  his  knowledge  of  a  given  event  would  fall  short  of 
absolute  certainty,  because  he  would  not  know  but  that 
the  course  of  nature  might  be  interrupted,  more  or  less, 
before  these  laws  had  time  to  produce  the  event.  And  his 
knowledge  that  a  given  event  would  not  happen  because 
it  was  not  provided  for  in  the  course  of  nature,  would  fall 
short  of  absolute  certainty,  because  he  could  not  tell  but 
that  God  would  produce  it  by  the  direct  exercise  of  His 
power,  or  that  He  might  enact  new  natural  laws  which 
would  produce  it,  as  natural  science  incontestably  proves 
that,  from  time  to  time,  additions  or  amendments  have 
been  made  to  the  code  of  natural  laws,  if  I  may  borrow  a 
figure  of  speech  from  the  nomenclature  of  human  affairs. 

I  suppose  it  is  now  sufficiently  plain  that  absolute 
knowledge  of  the  future  is  hypothetically  possible,  upon 
condition  that  one  thoroughly  understands  the  laws  of  the 
universe,  and  knows  whether  God  intends  to  change  any 
of  those  laws,  and  if  so,  what  change  is  to  be  made,  or  if  He 
intends  to  annul  any  or  all  of  them  ;  and  further,  whether 
He  intends  to  put  forth  His  power  at  any  time  and  place, 
independently  of  existing  laws,  and  if  so,  for  what  purpose. 

It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  prove  that  God  himself 
possesses  all  the  points  of  knowledge  above  enumerated, 
since  He  is  the  enactor  of  all  laws,  and  must  of  necessity 
know  His  own  mind.  And  if  He  choose  to  impart  this 
absolute  knowledge  in  regard  to  any  particular  event,  he 
to  whom  it  is  imparted  may  speak  with  the  same  degree 
of  certainty  concerning  that  as  concerning  any  past  event 
of  which  he  has  absolute  knowledge. 


24  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  reconciliation  of  this  with  the  first  idea,  that  of 
danger,  is  perfectly  plain.  When  Paul  spoke  of  the  dan- 
ger of  their  destruction,  he  spoke  from  his  imperfct  knowl- 
edge of  the  winds  and  waves  of  the  Mediterranean.  When 
he  spoke  of  the  certainty  of  their  salvation,  he  spoke  from 
the  absolute  knowledge  which  God  had  imparted  to  him. 

3d.  The  third  idea  is  contingency.  "  Except  these  abide 
in  the  ship,  ye  cannot  be  saved."  These  two  ideas,  of 
certainty  and  contingency,  are,  by  many,  considered  as 
direct  contradictories.  Human  language  cannot  express 
them  more  distinctly  than  they  are  expressed  here,  and 
both  are  predicated  of  the  same  thing.  This  ought,  at 
once,  to  satisfy  every  believer  of  the  Bible  that  they  are 
not  contradictories,  one  of  which  must  necessarily  be  false, 
even  though  we  may  be  unable  to  reconcile  them.  But 
my  object  is,  not  merely  to  assert  upon  the  authority  of 
Scripture  that  both  are  true,  and  that  they  must  therefore 
be  reconcilable  somehow,  but  to  show  them  to  be  con- 
sistent. I  shall  therefore  examine  very  carefully  the  dif- 
ferent senses  of  the  word  contingency.     Isaac  Taylor  says  : 

"  The  leaf  falls  on  a  particular  spot  in  consequence  of 
the  combined  influence  of  gravitation  and  the  movement 
of  the  air,  and  if  we  could  know  precisely  the  force  and 
direction  of  the  wind,  when  the  leaf  was  floating  in  the 
air,  we  might,  combining  this  with  the  laws  of  gravitation, 
predict  the  spot  on  which  it  would  alight ;  and  then  we 
should  no  longer  speak  of  that  event  as  contingent.  The 
rising  of  the  sun  to-morrow  is  not  spoken  of  as  a  contin- 
gent event,  because  it  is  thought  of  as  following  from  the 
established  order  of  causes.  But  the  fineness  of  to-mor- 
row we  think  contingent,  because  we  are  ignorant  of  the 
many  causes  upon  the  occurrence  of  which  fine  weather 
depends.  Yet,  if  we  knew  all  the  laws  of  the  atmosphere, 
and  the  actual  state  of  the  lower  heavens  to-day,  then  the 
fineness,  or  the  rain  and  wind  of  to-morrow,  would  be 
spoken  of  just  as  we  speak  of  the  rising  of  the  sun. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  2$ 

"  And  thus,  too,  the  future  actions  of  men  are  thought 
of  as  contingent,  because  the  motives  of  human  conduct 
are  far  too  multifarious,  too  much  hidden,  and  liable  to 
too  many  disturbing  influences  from  without,  to  be  known, 
or  even  surmised,  beforehand.  We  can  go  no  further  in 
our  anticipations  of  the  conduct  of  men,  than  to  say  con- 
ditionally— if  such  and  such  events  take  place,  it  is  proba- 
ble that  Mr.  M.  or  N.  will  act  in  this  or  that  manner. 
Our  notion  of  certainty  and  of  contingency  depends  so 
much  on  our  knowledge  or  ignorance  of  causes,  that  in- 
voluntarily we  think  an  event  that  is  to  happen  to- 
morrow, much  less  contingent  than  a  similar  event  that  is 
to  take  place  a  year  hence,  although  it  is  evident  both 
stand  precisely  on  the  same  ground  as  to  the  causes 
whence  they  are  to  spring,  or  by  which  they  are  to  be 
governed. 

"  Every  event  has  a  cause ;  in  this  sense,  therefore, 
nothing  is  contingent.  But  in  philosophical  language 
there  is  another  and  very  proper  sense  of  the  word  con- 
tingency, and  which  is  nearly  synonymous  with  the  word 
condition,  and  is  opposed  to  the  word  necessity.  Mathe- 
matical principles  are  necessary — that  is  to  say,  nothing 
could  make  them  otherwise  than  they  are.  It  cannot 
even  be  imagined  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  should 
be  equal  to  more  or  less  than  two  right  angles.  The  ex- 
istence and  attributes  of  God  are  also  in  the  same  sense 
necessary.  But  the  existence  of  any  creature,  or  class  of 
creatures,  or  the  actual  conformation  or  powers  of  such 
beings,  are  contingent — that  is  to  say,  they  might  not 
have  existed  at  all,  or  they  might  have  been  otherwise 
constituted  than  they  are." — Elements  of  Thought:  article — 
Contingency. 

I  believe  the  word  contingency  is  often  used  in  a  very 
vague,  negative  sense,  rather  than  to  convey  any  well  de- 
fined, positive  idea.  It  is  often  used  as  synonymous  with 
uncertainty.     Yet  I  suppose  those  who  use  it  thus  would 


26  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY    AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

scarcely  say  that  the  event  to  which  they  apply  the  term  has 
no  cause,  or  that  the  cause  may  fail  to  produce  its  effect, 
producing  a  different  one,  or  none  at  all.  I  believe  they 
use  it  without  taking  the  trouble  to  form  a  distinct  idea 
in  their  own  minds  as  to  its  meaning.  However  this  may 
be,  I  think  it  has  been  sufficiently  shown  that  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  uncertainty  in  the  things  themselves.  This 
use  of  the  word,  then,  either  conveys  the  idea  of  uncer- 
tainty in  the  mind  of  the  speaker,  that  he  does  not  know 
whether  the  event  will  happen  or  not,  or  else  it  is  simply- 
used  because  he  has  not  formed  his  idea  into  a  distinct, 
well  defined  conception. 

The  next  meaning  that  I  shall  specify  is  the  one  set 
forth  in  the  extract,  as  opposed  to  necessity. 

I  must  here  pause  to  speak  of  what  some  have  said  oi 
contingent  truths  and  necessary  truths. 

This  matter  may  be  simplified  by  taking  the  word  truth 
as  a  generic  term,  including  facts,  existences  and  princi- 
ples, as  three  distinct  species.  It  is  true  that  the  sun  rose 
this  morning.  This  I  call  a  fact — something  done  ;  which 
is  the  strict,  etymological  meaning  of  the  word.  It  is  true 
that  the  sun  exists.  This  is  not  a  fact,  an  event,  but  an 
existence.  It  is  also  true  that  the  sum  of  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles.  This  I  call  a 
principle  for  want  of  a  more  accurate  term. 

It  will  be  readily  seen  that  the  two  first  classes  of  truths 
differ  from  the  last  one  in  two  respects  ;  First,  each  fact 
or  event  necessarily  supposes  a  cause,  and  so  does  each 
existence,  except  the  great  First  Cause  or  Fountain  of 
existence.  But  the  principle  that  the  three  angles  of  a 
triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  neither  requires 
nor  admits  the  supposition  of  a  cause.  It  is  manifestly 
an  eternal  and  omnipresent  principle,  not  caused,  but  self- 
existent. 

Secondly :  Any  given  event  or  existence  may  be  dis- 
pensed with  in  thought,  supposed  not  to   exist.     I  think 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  2J 

I.  Taylor  is  wrong  in  saying:  "It  cannot  even  be  im- 
agined that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  should  be  equal 
to  less  or  more  than  two  right  angles.  The  existence  and 
attributes  of  God  are  also  in  the  same  sense  necessary." 
It  is  indeed  impossible  to  reverse  the  first  in  thought. 
But  atheism  is  not  impossible  in  conception.  I  find  no 
more  difficulty  in  conceiving  the  non-existence  of  God 
than  that  of  any  one  of  His  creatures.  If,  however,  any 
one  says  he  cannot  conceive  the  non-existence  of  God,  I 
shall  not  stop  to  dispute  this  point.  The  distinction  be- 
tween necessary  and  contingent  truths,  as  some  call  them, 
is  this:  the  contingent  truths  assert  that  something  exists, 
did  or  will  exist,  or  that  something  is,  was,  or  will  be  done. 
Each  has  a  cause,  and  each  may,  without  any  difficulty, 
be  supposed  not  to  exist,  or  not  to  happen.  But  the 
necessary  truths,  have  no  connection  with  any  actual 
events  or  existences,  are  general  principles,  uncaused,  and 
irreversible  even  in  thought.  No  being  caused  the  general 
principle  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts, 
or  that  a  figure  having  three  angles  must  have  three  sides- 
Neither  is  it  possible  for  any  being  to  change  them,  either 
really  or  in  conception.  All  facts  and  existences,  if  we 
omit  the  existence  of  God,  which  I  think  ought  to  be  in- 
cluded, are  contingent,  in  the  sense  that  they  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  different  from  what  they  are,  or  not  to  be  at 
all.  All  general  principles  are  necessary,  in  the  sense  that 
they  can  neither  be  annihilated  nor  changed  even  in  con- 
ception. 

But  the  last  and  most  common  sense  of  the  word  con- 
tingent, is  dependent,  conditional,  which  is  expressed  by 
the  words  if,  unless,  etc.  And  this  is  what  many  think 
to  be  directly  contradictory  to  certainty.  Paul  had  said, 
with  positive  certainty,  that  no  man's  life  should  be  lost. 
Now  he  tells  them  :  "  Except  these  abide  in  the  ship  ye 
cannot  be  saved."  Let  us  attempt  to  put  these  two 
assertions  together. 


28  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

We,  looking  back  to  the  event,  say,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
without  the  least  uncertainty,  that  their  lives  were  saved. 
Nor  do  I  suppose  any  one  will  for  a  moment  think  he  sees 
any  contradiction  or  inconsistency  in  adding  the  assertion, 
unless  the  sailors  had  remained  in  the  ship,  they  could  not 
have  been  saved.  The  first  is  a  simple  assertion  that  a 
certain  event  occurred,  without  saying  anything  about  its 
cause,  a  cause,  however,  being  supposed  in  this,  as,  in  all 
other  events,  whether  mentioned  or  not.  The  second  as- 
sertion is  merely  a  specification  of  the  cause,  or  of  anyone 
of  the  causes,  a  causa  sine  qua  non  of  the  event.  The  one 
simply  asserts  a  fact,  an  effect,  neither  asserting  nor  deny- 
ing anything  at  all  concerning  its  cause.  The  other  asserts 
that  the  effect  was  dependent  upon  a  cause,  and  specifies 
what  that  cause  was.  There  is  manifestly  no  inconsis- 
tency here,  nor  do  I  suppose  that  any  one  will  imagine 
that  there  is. 

Now  let  us  change  our  position  in  relation  to  the  event. 
The  moon  will  be  eclipsed  at  a  certain  time.  Unless  the 
earth  should  come  between  it  and  the  sun,  it  will  not  be 
eclipsed.  Does  our  position  in  relation  to  the  event,  as 
being  before  or  after  it,  at  all  affect  the  consistency  of  the 
two  assertions  concerning  it  ?  When  we  say  that  any  given 
event  will  happen,  nothing  at  all  is  either  asserted  or  de- 
nied concerning  its  cause  or  causes.  But  it  is  implied  that 
all  the  agencies  necessary  to  its  production  are  actually  in 
existence  and  operation,  without  specifying  any  of  them. 
When  we  say  it  will  occur  if  something  else  should  happen, 
and  it  will  not  happen  unless  the  other  does,  we  specify 
the  cause,  or  one  of  the  causes,  necessary  to  its  produc- 
tion, without  either  asserting  or  denying  the  actual  exis- 
tence of  that  cause.  In  the  one  case,  we  assert  its  insepar- 
able connection,  near  or  remote,  with  existing,  operating 
causes.  We  assign  it  a  place  in  the  course  of  actual  events, 
which  has  already  been  treated  of  under  the  second  head. 
In  the  other  case,  we  assert  its  connection,  not  with  the 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  29 

k_i:ually  existing  series  of  things,  but  with  one  or  more 
particular  thing  or  things,  without  either  asserting  or  de- 
nying the  connection  of  these  two  links  with  the  chain  of 
actual  events. 

When  one  says  that  an  event  will  occur,  he  certainly 
ought  not  to  be  understood  as  meaning  that  it  is  to  happen 
without  a  cause,  although  the  cause  may  not  be  specified. 
He  simply  asserts  that  it  occupies  a  place  in  the  series  of 
events  already  spoken  of.  And  if  he  says  at  the  next  mo- 
ment that  it  will  not  occur  unless  something  else  does,  he 
points  out  one  cause  or  condition  upon  which  it  depends, 
nearly  or  remotely. 

Now  where  is  the  contradiction  between  certainty  and 
contingency?  In  one,  we  impliedly  connect  the  given 
event  with  the  whole  course  of  events,  without  specifying 
any  particular  one  of  the  number.  In  the  other,  we  assert  its 
connection  with  a  particular  event,  without  asserting  or 
denying  the  connection  of  these  two  with  the  actual  course 
of  events.  The  only  thing  asserted  is  a  connection,  and 
the  only  thing  denied  is  the  possibility  of  severing  that 
connection.  Both  must  happen  or  neither  can.  (For 
further  remarks  on  Contingency,  see  Strictures  on  Tappan, 
Essay  IV.) 

If  the  preceding  reasoning  be  correct,  it  will  assist  us 
veiy  much  in  the  solution  of  several  other  questions  which 
have  great  need  to  be  solved. 


30  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 


ESSAY  SECOND— PROVIDENCE. 


I  have  often  heard  expressions  used,  and  sometimes  by- 
very  intelligent  and  pious  persons,  which  convey  ideas  of 
the  providence  of  God  very  different  from  what  seems  to 
me  to  be  the  true  doctrine.  We  frequently  hear  it  said, 
this  or  that  was  a  special  providence.  This  seems  to  con- 
vey the  idea  that  God  exercises  a  sort  of  general  super- 
vision over  the  affairs  of  the  universe,  as  a  king  does  over 
those  of  his  kingdom,  leaving  the  execution  of  the  minutiae 
to  subordinate  agents ;  but  that  now  and  then  He  deigns 
to  give  special,  personal  attention  to  some  of  these  things, 
as  a  king  occasionally  writes  an  autograph  letter,  or  gives 
his  personal  attention  to  some  affair,  either  on  account  of 
its  own  importance,  or  for  the  sake  of  a  personal  favorite. 
How  utterly  erroneous  this  notion  is,  the  Savior  teaches 
us,  when  He  says  :  "Are  not  two  sparrows  sold  for  a  far- 
thing? and  one  of  them  shall  not  fall  to  the  ground  with- 
out your  Father.  But  the  very  hairs  of  your  head  are 
all  numbered." 

We  also  hear  frequently  of  providential  interferences. 
One  has  been  thrown  from  a  horse,  and  fallen  very  near  to 
a  rock.  It  is  said,  nothing  but  a  providential  interference 
prevented  his  brains"from  being  dashed  out. 

But  before  I  proceed  to  discuss  this  subject,  I  will  show 
that  I  have  not  put  words  into  people's  mouths,  such  as 
they  themselves  never  use,  in  order  to  have  an  opportunity 
to  refute  them.  The  first  extract  is  from  a  Methodist 
newspaper,  which  perhaps  ranks  as  high  as  any  in  the 
country.  The  reply  is  from  the  Religious  Herald,  a  Bap- 
tist paper  holding  a  very  high  rank  in  the  denomination, 
and  was  copied   by  the  Journal  and  Messenger,  an   able 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  3  I 

Baptist  paper  published  in  Cincinnati,  O.,  November  25th, 

1859: 

SPECIAL  PROVIDENCE. 

"  A  correspondent  of  the  Baltimore  Christian  Advocate 
refreshes  us  with  the  following  grave  deliverance : 

"'  Now,  it  is  all  nonsense  for  any  one  to  say  that  they 
believe  both  in  God's  eternal,  unchangeable  decrees  and  a 
special  providence.  For,  if  everything  is  moving  on  after 
an  order  that  was  ordained  in  the  beginning,  from  all 
eternity,  nothing  special  can  transpire  ;  for,  as  I  under- 
stand the  term,  it  implies  an  innovation  upon  the  estab- 
lished order  of  things;  if  it  does  not  mean  this,  then  the 
word,  in  a  theological  sense,  is  ambiguous  and  ought  not 
to  be  used.' 

"  A  special  providence  imports  simply  that  the  Great 
First  Cause  steps  in  to  modify  the  operation  of  second 
causes.  And  is  it  difficult  to  conceive  that  this  '  stepping 
in  '  should  have  been  fixed  upon  by  an  eternal  unchange- 
able decree  ?  and  that  the  decree  should  need  the  '  step- 
ping in  '  for  its  accomplishment  ?  We  think  the  concep- 
tion quite  an  easy  one.  On  the  other  hand,  how  Armin- 
ianism,  which  is  a  philosophy  of  second  causes,  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  special  providence  which  modifies 
their  operation — this  strikes  us  as  a  difficulty  next  to  in- 
surmountable."— Religions  Herald. 

The  following  is  from  the  WatcJuna)i  and  Reflector, 
April  5th,  1869.  It  is,  however,  not  an  editorial,  but  a 
contribution  : 

A   SPECIAL   PROVIDENCE. 

•'  The  Bible  records  many  instances  of  the  Divine  inter- 
position to  deliver  prophets  and  apostles  from  impending 
dangers.  We  cannot  believe  that  such  instances  were 
confined  to  God's  ancient  people ;  they  are  continued  at 
the  present  day,  if  our  eyes  are  clear-sighted  to  discern 
them.  Dr.  Kane,  in  his  fascinating  volumes,  acknowledges, 
very  devoutly,  his  faith  in  a  special  providence,  and  the 
late  Gen.  Havelock  recognized  many  interpositions  in  his 


32  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

own  personal  experience.  We  give  a  single  illustration, 
taken  from  his  biography,  by  Mr.  Headly.  He  was  at 
Cabool,  as  aid  to  the  ill-fated  Gen.  Elphinstone,  when  the 
regiment,  of  which  he  was  adjutant,  was  sent  to  Jellala- 
bad,  under  Col.  Sale.  Havelock  was  greatly  dissatisfied 
with  the  military  and  civil  administration  of  Gen.  Elphin- 
stone, and  hesitated  whether  he  should  remain  at  Cabool, 
or  join  his  regiment  at  Jellalabad.  His  biographer  shall 
tell  the  rest : 

"  '  Uncertain  what  course  to  adopt,  he  took  up  his  Bible, 
that  lay  on  the  table,  and  opened  it,  casually,  at  the  39th 
chapter  of  Jeremiah,  16-19  verses,  and  read,  with  pro- 
found emotions,  what  seemed  to  him,  at  the  time,  the 
language  of  God,  directed  to  him  : 

"'Go  and  speak  to  Ebcd-MelccJi,  the  Ethiopian,  saying: 
Thus  saiih  the  Lord  of  Hosts,  the  God  of  Israel,  Behold  I 
will  bring  my  words  upon  this  city  for  evil  and  not  for  good, 
and  they  shall  be  accomplished  in  that  day  before  thee.  But 
I  will  deliver  thee  in  that  day,  saith  the  Loi  d,  and  thou 
shall  not  be  given  into  the  hands  of  the  men  of  whom  thou 
art  afraid.  For  I  zvill  surely  deliver  thee,  and  thou  shalt 
not  fall  by  the  sword,  but  thy  life  shall  be  for  a  prey  unto 
thee,  because  thou  hast  put  thy  faith  in  Me,  saith  the  Lord.' 

'"By  the  time  Havelock  had  finished  reading  these 
verses,  his  decision  was  taken  ;  he  resolved  to  leave  the 
doomed  city ;  and  obtaining  permission  to  join  Sale,  hast- 
ened at  once  to  the  camp. 

"  A  few  months  later,  Cabool  was  evacuated  by  the 
English  troops,  and  of  the  large  and  noble  army  that  gar- 
risoned it,  but  a  single  fugitive  escaped  to  Jellalabad.'  ' 

The  following  I  extracted  from  a  religious  newspaper, 
but  I  unfortunately  neglected  to  mark  the  name,  and  I  can 
not  ascertain  it  : 

PROVIDENTIAL   COINCIDENCES. 

"  If  all  the  incidents  of  human  life  were  recorded  by  the 
pen  of  inspiration,  we  should  find  records  of  the  Divine 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  33 

interposition  as  clearly  marked  as  in  the  Old  Testament, 
times.  Who  can  fail  to  recognize  in  the  following  inter- 
esting occurrences  the  hand  of  Providence? 

"When  Russia  was,  in  1812,  thrown  into  consternation 
by  the  invasion  of  the  French,  no  one  in  the  imperial 
household  or  council  maintained  a  calm  and  composed 
spirit,  under  the  daily  reports  of  fresh  disasters,  except 
Prince  Galitzin.  The  Emperor  remarked  this  with  sur- 
prise, and  one  day,  while  they  were  alone,  asked  how  it 
happened.  The  Prince  drew  forth  a  small  Bible  from  his 
pocket,  and  held  it  towards  the  Emperor,  who  stretched 
out  his  hand  to  receive  it,  when  by  accident  the  volume 
fell  to  the  ground.  Being  instantly  picked  up  by  the 
Prime,  it  was  found  to  have  opened  at  the  ninety-first 
Psalm  :  "  He  that  dwelleth  in  the  secret  place  of  the  Most 
High  shall  abide  under  the  shadow  of  the  Almighty.  I 
will  say  of  the  Lord,  He  is  my  refuge  and  my  fortress; 
my  God  ;  in  Him  I  will  trust.'  (verse  2.) 

"  '  O,  that  your  majesty  would  seek  that  Refuge,'  replied 
the  Prince,  after  his  royal  master  and  he  had  read  the 
passage  together ;  and  then  hastened  from  the  royal  pres- 
ence. The  Emperor  retained  the  Bible,  and  doubtless 
read  the  Psalm  to  the  end. 

"  Shortly  after,  a  day  of  supplication  and  fasting  was 
ordered  by  Alexander ;  and  the  Pope,  as  the  priests  of  the 
Greek  church  are  called,  whose  turn  it  was  to  preach  be- 
fore the  court,  chose  for  his  text  the  ninety-first  Psalm, 
without  having  been  induced  thereto  by  any  hint  from 
either  the  Emperor  or  his  minister. 

"  On  the  afternoon  of  the  fast  day,  Alexander  sent  to  his 
private  chaplain,  desiring  him  to  come  and  read  a  portion 
of  the  Bible  to  him  in  his  tent.  The  official  came,  and 
commenced  his  duty  with  the  ninety-first  Psalm. 

"  '  Hold  !'  cried  the  Emperor,  rather  offended  by  what  he 
not  unnaturally  concluded  must  be  the  result  of  collusion  ; 
'  who  desired  you  to  read  that  particular  Psalm  to  me  ?' 


34  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  '  God,'  replied  the  chaplain,  with  great  solemnity. 

"  '  How  mean  you?'  exclaimed  the  Emperor. 

"  '  Taken  by  surprise,'  resumed  the  chaplain,  '  by  your 
majesty's  command,  and  feeling  the  high  responsibility 
which  would  rest  on  my  choice,  I  knelt  down  and  im- 
plored the  Almighty  to  guide  me  in  the  selection  of  the 
Scripture  I  should  read  in  the  event  of  your  majesty  leav- 
ing me  without  directions  on  the  subject,  and  the  ninety- 
first  Psalm  was  brought  so  powerfully  to  my  mind  that  I 
could  not  doubt  that  was  the  answer  to  my  prayer?' 

"  The  impression  made  on  the  Emperor  by  these  remark- 
able coincidences  is  said  to  have  been  deep  and  lasting.' 

These  extracts,  which  I  think  may  be  assumed  as  cor- 
rectly representing  the  ordinary  opinions  concerning  what 
are  called  special  providences,  and  providential  interposi- 
tions, are  univocal  in  considering  them  as  departures  from 
the  established  laws  of  nature,  and  the  production  of 
events  for  which  no  provision  was  made  in  the  course  or 
system  of  nature ;  and  further,  that  God  gives  a  degree  of 
attention  to  these  which  He  does  not  bestow  on  ordinary 
events. 

To  resume  the  case  already  stated  :  The  meaning  of  the 
language  is,  that  the  forces  of  gravity  and  projection  were, 
sufficient  to  carry  the  man  thrown  from  his  horse  against 
the  rock,  and  that  with  such  power  as  would  have  crushed 
his  head,  had  they  not  been,  perhaps,  not  wholly  sus- 
pended, but  at  least  relaxed,  so  that  they  did  not  produce 
their  natural,  legitimate  result.  I  am  confident  of  show- 
ing, first,  that  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  of  an  inter- 
position, but  that  all  the  evidence  we  have  is  on  the  other 
side  ;  and  secondly,  that  if  there  was  an  interposition,  it 
ought  not  to  be  called  providential  but  miraculous. 

First,  there  is  no  evidence  at  all  of  an  interposition,  but 
all  the  evidence  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  case  is 
against  the  supposition  of  there  being  an  interference. 
That  the  man  fell  very  near  the  stone  is  not  sufficient  to 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  35 

raise  the  slightest  presumption  of  such  a  thing.  It  is  per- 
fectly evident  that  the  force  of  gravity,  acting  as  it  always 
does,  must  have  brought  him  to  the  ground  somewhere; 
and  wherever  that  might  have  been,  there  must  have  been 
a  place  very  near  it.  He  must,  then,  according  to  the 
laws  of  nature,  have  fallen  very  near  to  some  particular 
place,  without  falling  upon  it ;  for  he  could  not  possibly 
fall  on  every  spot  of  the  earth.  It  will  be  readily  admitted 
that  his  head  having  fallen  within  an  inch  of  a  given  spot, 
affords  no  evidence  whatever  that  he  would  have  fallen 
on  that  spot  but  for  an  interference  with  the  laws  of  na- 
ture. What  is  there,  then,  in  the  fact  that  the  given 
place  contained  a  stone,  to  raise  the  presumption  that  the 
head  of  him  who  fell  near  it  would  have  fallen  on  it  but 
for  some  interference  with  natural  laws?  If  the  falling  of 
a  stone,  or  any  other  substance,  upon  any  given  place, 
rather  than  an  inch  further  this  way  or  that,  does  not  lead 
to  the  supposition  of  an  interference  with  the  laws  of  na- 
ture, neither  should  the  fact  that  the  falling  body  is  a 
man,  and  that  the  spot  upon  which  he  does  not  fall  con- 
tains a  stone,  raise  such  a  supposition. 

It  is  impossible  to  test  the  forces  themselves  with  such 
accuracy  as  to  determine  certainly  whether  or  not  there 
was  an  interference.  We  may,  from  knowing  the  amount 
and  quality  of  gunpowder,  the  weight  of  the  gun  in  which 
it  is  placed,  and  the  weight  and  shape  of  the  ball,  deter- 
mine with  considerable  accuracy  where  the  ball  will  fall 
according  to  the  natural  operation  of  the  forces  acting 
upon  it.  But  this  knowledge,  which  is  only  proximate 
after  all,  is  the  result  of  numerous  experiments  made  un- 
der similar  circumstances,  and  then  under  circumstances 
varying  in  exact  and  calculable  degrees.  But  no  such  ex- 
periments can  be  made  in  the  supposed  case.  No  one 
would  voluntarily  risk  his  life — and  even  if  he  should  it 
would  be  impossible  to  make  the  horse  put  forth  exactly 
the  same  exertion  in  each   instance — nor  is  it  possible  to 


36  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

learn  with  any  degree  of  accuracy  the  relatjve   quantities 
of  power  put  forth  in  the  different  instances. 

It  is  thus  perfectly  clear  that  we  cannot  prove  to  a  cer- 
tainly, nor  even  to  a  probability,  that  there  is  an  inter- 
ference with  the  laws  of  nature,  such  a  relaxation  of  them 
as  to  prevent  them  from  producing  their  natural,  legiti- 
mate effects. 

But  there  is  not  only  an  entire  want  of  evidence  of  an 
interference,  but  we  have  evidence — if  not  amounting  to 
a  demonstration,  which  I  do  not  pretend — we  have  real 
evidence  that  there  is  no  interference.  Our  general  ex- 
peri  nee  of  the  uniformity  of  natural  laws  leads  us  to  the 
belief  of  their  uniform  action  in  particular  cases,  unless 
the  contrary  is  proved.  The  presumption  is  always  in 
favor  of  uniformity,  and  hence  the  burden  of  proof  lies 
upon  him  who  asserts  that  this  uniformity  is  broken  in 
upon  in  a  given  instance.  We  act,  in  all  the  affairs  of  life, 
upon  the  supposition  of  this  uniformity.  And  this  gen- 
eral uniformity  is  very  strong  presumptive  evidence  of  its 
existence  in  each  particular  case,  which  can  only  be  over- 
balanced by  the  clearest  evidence  of  a  departure  from  the 
general  rule. 

"  Induction  .  .  .  rests  on  the  constancy,  the  uni- 
formity of  nature,  and  on  the  instinctive  expectation  we 
have  of  this  stability." — Hamilton's  Logic,  pp.  451. 

Is  it  too  much,  now,  to  assume  that  the  man  fell  where 
he  did,  in  accordance  with  the  operation  of  natural  laws, 
just  as  a  stone  is  governed  by  them  in  its  descent? 

But  secondly,  if  there  is  an  interference,  it  ought  not 
to  be  called  a  providential  but  a  miraculous  interference. 
So  far  as  we  know,  God  never  works  in  any  except  two 
methods,  viz :  first,  by  the  direct,  immediate  exertion  of 
His  power,  as  He  created  the  world,  stopped  the  course 
of  nature  to  favor  Israel  with  a  supernatural  continuance 
of  day-light,  and  changed  water  into  wine ;  secondly,  by 
the  instrumentality  of  natural  law.     Paul  declares  that   it 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  37 

is  God  who  giveth  the  wheat  a  bod}-.  What  power 
quickens  the  germ  of  the  grain,  causing  it  to  expand  "  like 
a  thing  of  life,"  instead  of  lying  imbedded  in  the  earth 
like  a  grain  of  sand  ?  What  wisdom  directs  its  roots  to 
sink  into  the  earth,  and  its  blade  to  seek  the  light  and  heat 
above?  By  whose  wisdom  is  it  directed  to  seek  those 
minute  particles  from  earth  and  air,  which,  when  com- 
bined, shall  form  a  stalk,  and  finally  a  head  of  wheat  in- 
stead of  some  other  grain?  By  what  power  are  these  suc- 
cessively elevated  from  the  earth  through  the  stalk 
in  opposition  to  the  force  of  gravity  ?  And  by  what 
knowledge  is  each  particle  guided  to  its  proper  place, 
some  to  form  the  stalk,  others  the  leaves,  and  others  the 
grain  ?  And  then  by  what  chemistry  are  they  transformed 
from  atoms  of  gas,  water,  earthy  salts,  etc.,  into  vegetable 
matter? 

Although  there  are  mysteries  here  which  are  utterly  be- 
yond our  discovery — -because  we  have  no  faculties  for  their 
investigation — yet  the  whole  is  clearly  natural,  in  the  sense 
that  the  events  follow  each  other  in  a  regular  order  of  con- 
secution, and  have  that  relation  to  each  other  which  we 
call  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

The  first  of  these  methods  we  call  miraculous ;  the 
second,  providential.  If  any  one  insists  on  the  technical 
meaning  of  the  word  miracle,  viz  :  a  repeal  or  suspension 
of  some  natural  law,  and  would  thus  exclude  the  creation 
of  the  world  from  the  category  of  miracles,  I  shall  not 
stop  to  defend  the  propriety  of  the  use  that  I  make  of 
the  word.  Whether  I  use  it  in  exactly  the  same  sense  as 
the  theologians  have  done,  is  not  a  matter  of  any  great 
importance,  if  the  reader  distinctly  understands  the  mean- 
ing which  I  would  convey  by  its  use.  I  use  it  to  include 
all  those  events  that  are  produced  by  the  immediate 
agency  of  the  power  of  God,  because  it  is  the  best  word  I 
know  for  the  purpose  ;  and  I  include  all  those  events  that 
are  produced  by  the  agency  of  any  other  power,  whether 


38  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

animate  or  inanimate,  mental  or  material,  in  the  category 
of  providential. 

If  the  correctness  of  this  classification  be  admitted, 
then,  assuming  that  the  laws  of  nature  would  have  carried 
the  man  against  the  stone,  and  that  with  sufficient  vio- 
lence to  destroy  his  life,  had  they  not  been  relaxed,  and 
thus  prevented  from  producing  their  legitimate  result,  it  is 
clear  that  the  saving  of  his  life  belongs  to  the  class  of 
miraculous,  and  not  to  that  of  providential,  events. 

I  will  now  explain  what  I  think  to  be  the  true  theory  of 
providence.  That  God  governs  the  whole  universe  is  not 
a  deduction  from  Scriptural  premises,  but  the  explicit 
statement  of  Scripture.  "  He  worketh  all  things  after  the 
counsel  of  His  own  will."  And  this  general  statement  is 
particularized  by  the  Savior's  assurance  that  "  the  hairs  of 
our  heads  are  all  numbered,  and  not  a  sparrow  falleth  on 
the  ground  without  our  Father."  But  the  question  which 
I  am  now  attempting  to  answer  is,  how  does  He  thus  con- 
trol all  things,  small  and  great  ? 

Even  human  beings  usually  peer  into  the  future  as  far  as 
possible,  consider  what  purposes  they  wish  to  accomplish, 
and,  as  far  as  they  can,  set  things  in  such  order  as  they  sup- 
pose will  most  probably  accomplish  their  purposes.  And 
that  man  is  wisest  who  takes  the  most  comprehensive  view, 
embraces  the  largest  number  of  purposes,  small  and  great, 
and  so  arranges  his  system  of  plans  in  consistency  with 
each  other  as  to  accomplish  the  greatest  number  of  them. 
And  yet  events  often  prove,  by  their  stern,  convincing 
logic,  the  truth  of  the  quaint  saying  of  Burns : 

"  The  best  laid  schemes  of  mice  and  men 

Gang  aft  agley." 

They  find  it  often  necessary  to  change  their  plans,  partly 
or  wholly,  and  to  make  special  efforts  to  accomplish  the 
main  design,  or  some  subsidiary  purpose  which  did  not 
enter  into  the  original  conception,  or  else  was  not  suffi- 
ciently   provided    for ;    they   find    it  necessary    to    make 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  39 

special  efforts,  I  say,  instead  of  simply  pursuing  and  exe- 
cuting the  original  plan.  The  necessity  for  these  modifi- 
cations of  the  primitive  design,  these  resorts  to  expedients, 
to  accomplish  the  main  or  some  subsidiary  purpose,  may 
spring  from  several  sources — from  ignorance.  They  may 
not  sufficiently  understand  the  business  in  which  they  are 
about  to  engage  to  know  what  means  are  necessary  for 
the  accomplishment  of  the  end  or  ends  which  they  desire 
— or  from  want  of  means.  The  means  devised  may  be 
adequate  but  not  within  their  reach.  And  hence  they 
may  find  it  necessary  to  accomplish  their  purposes  by  oth- 
er means  which  are  at  their  command — or,  in  the  progress 
of  events,  new  purposes  may  appear  highly  desirable  which 
were  not  seen,  and  of  course  not  provided  for,  in  the  pri- 
mary scheme.  We  have  lately  had  a  remarkable  illustra- 
tion of  the  necessity  of  modifying  a  preconceived  arrange- 
ment arising  from  the  inadequacy  of  the  means  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  end,  in  the  launch  of  the  mammoth 
vessel,  the  Great  Eastern.  It  is  evident  that  if  the  orig- 
inal plan  be  adequate  to  the  accomplishment  of  one's 
purpose,  and  he  have  the  means  of  executing  it,  nothing 
but  mere  caprice  will  cause  him  to  deviate  from  it,  unless 
in  the  progress  of  events  he  should  discover  a  method 
better  in  some  respect.  Nothing  but  imperfection  of  some 
kind  in  the  planner  will  cause  him  to  depart  from  his  own 
plan.  Nothing  but  want  of  wisdom  to  form  the  best  plan, 
want  of  power  to  execute  it,  or  mere  caprice,  will  divert 
him. 

That  God  had  a  number  and  variety  of  purposes  in 
view  when  He  began  the  work  of  creation,  no  one  will 
deny,  unless  some  one  has  the  hardihood  to  say  that  God 
wrought  without  an  object  in  view,  and  without  knowing 
why  He  wrought.  "  Known  unto  God  are  all  His  works 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world."  He  "  declares  the  end 
from  the  beginning."  God  undoubtedly  had  purposes 
which  he  wished   to  accomplish,  and  a  plan  or  system  of 


4-0  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

plans  for  their  accomplishment,  consisting  of  many  parts, 
none  of  which  was  too  large  for  His  comprehension,  none 
too  small  for  His  notice,  nor  any  too  complicated  for  His 
understanding.  He  looked  forward  through  the  vista  of 
the  future,  and  distinctly  took  in  every  purpose  which  He 
wished  to  accomplish,  from  the  greatest  to  the  least,  and 
arranged  the  creation  and  the  laws  which  He  gave  it,  with 
reference  to  each  of  those  purposes.  For  we  see  every- 
where order,  arrangement,  adaptation  of  means  to  ends. 

From  what  source  could  there  arise  a  necessity  for  the 
smallest  change  in  those  arrangements? — not  from  igno- 
rance: for  He  necessarily  knows  His  own  laws  and  His 
own  mind.  "  His  understanding  is  infinite" — nor  from 
want  of  power:  for  there  is  no  power  except  what  has 
proceeded  from  Him.  There  cannot,  therefore,  be  any 
resistance  of  His  power.  And  as  for  His  command  over 
means,  when  He  wishes  to  use  means,  not  only  all  the  re- 
sources of  creation,  but  of  infinite  creative  power,  are 
under  His  control — nor  yet  the  presentation  of  new  ends 
to  be  accomplished:  for  "known  unto  God  are  all  His 
works  from  the  beginning  of  the  world."  Nor  can  capri- 
ciousness  cause  him  to  deviate  from  the  primary  scheme: 
for  "  with  Him  there  is  no  variableness,  neither  shadow  of 
turning."  Not  one  of  those  imperfections  which  make 
men  "unstable  as  water"  in  carrying  out  their  purposes, 
has  place  in  God.  Therefore,  not  the  slightest  modifica- 
tion of  the  original  plan  can  be  necessary  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  any  given  event. 

It  may  appear  at  first  view,  that  miracles,  such  as  were 
wrought  by  interrupting  the  course  of  nature,  overthrow 
the  position  here  taken.  For  these  were  events  which 
might  have  been  accomplished  by  natural  means,  at  least 
some  of  them,  had  they  been  contemplated  and  provided 
for  in  the  original  arrangement.  Is  not  their  accomplish- 
ment by  the  direct  energy  of  divine  power,  a  plain  demon- 
stration that  departure  from  the  primitive  arrangement  is 


ESSAYS— THEOLOGY    AND  PHILOSOPHY.  41 

necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  some  events  ?  Whether 
we  attribute  it  to  oversight,  or  to  imperfection  of  the  ar- 
rangement which  was  intended  to  accomplish  them,  or 
whether  we  just  frankly  acknowledge  that  we  can  give  no 
account  at  all  of  the  reason  for  the  necessity,  is  not  the 
fact  that  they  were  accomplished  by  supernatural  power 
experimental  demonstration  that  there  is  necessity  in  some 
instances  at  least  for  a  deviation  from  the  established 
order  of  nature,  and  from  the  original  plan? 

If  we  look  simply  at  the  fact  that  miracles  have  been 
wrought,  we  can  scarcely  avoid  such  a  conclusion.  But  if 
we  take  in  the  intention  as  well  as  the  fact,  I  think  we 
shall  find  that  they  rather  corroborate  the  view  above 
expressed  than  militate  against  it. 

Take  the  case  of  the  Savior's  transforming  water  into 
wine.  Might  not  the  wine  have  been  supplied  providen- 
tially, according  to  the  laws  of  nature?  And  is  not  the 
fact  that  it  was  not  thus  done,  but  miraculously  furnished, 
indisputable  evidence  that  God  here  saw  good  to  accom- 
plish a  purpose  for  which  no  provision  had  been  made  in 
the  primitive  arrangement,  and  which  required  a  deviation 
from  that  arrangement,  and  the  use  of  an  expedient,  or 
special  exertion  ? 

Before  we  so  conclude,  let  us  inquire  into  the  object  of 
the  change.  Was  it  simply  to  furnish  wine  for  the  wed- 
ding? If  so,  I  see  not  how  we  can  avoid  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  Savior  here  wished  to  accomplish  an  end  for 
which  no  natural  provision  had  been  made,  and  which 
must  therefore  either  be  done  supernaturally  or  not  at  all. 
But  this  was  but  a  subordinate  object.  The  beloved,  dis- 
ciple gives  us  the  main  purpose:  "This  beginning  of 
miracles  did  Jesus  in  Cana  of  Galilee,  and  manifested 
forth  His  glory;  and  His  disciples  believed  on  Him."  The 
system  of  revealed  religion  formed  a  part,  the  chief  part,  of 
the  primitive  design  of  the  creation  of  the  universe.  And 
it  was   intended   to  be  indubitably  authenticated.     And, 


42  ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

according-  to  the  natural  constitution  of  the  human  -mind, 
we  believe  that  no  one  can  suspend  a  law  of  nature  but 
the  "one  Lawgiver"  who  first  enacted  those  laws.  It 
seems  also  natural  for  us  to  believe  that  He  will  not  do  it 
at  the  request  of  one  for  whom  He  has  no  regard.  "  God 
heareth  not  sinners."  Therefore,  when  a  miracle  is 
wrought  at  the  word  of  any  man,  (it  is  not  necessary  here 
to  discuss  whether  God  personally  works  the  miracle  at 
the  request  of  the  apparent  agent,  or  delegates  the  power 
to  those  whose  character  and  mission  He  wishes  to  en- 
dorse and  corroborate,) — I  say,  when  a  miracle  is  wrought 
at  the  word  or  by  the  seeming  agency  of  any  being,  we 
seem  naturally  to  accept  it  as  God's  endorsement  of  his 
character  and  mission.  Nicodemus  spoke  a  general  senti- 
ment of  the  human  race,  when  he  said  :  "  Rabbi,  we  know 
that  thou  art  a  teacher  come  from  God  :  for  no  man  can 
do  these  miracles  that  thou  doest,  except  God  be  with 
him." 

The  chief  object  of  changing  the  water  into  wine  was, 
not  to  furnish  the  guests  with  wine,  but  so  to  manifest 
His  glory  that  His  disciples  should  believe  on  Him.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  opening  of  the  eyes  of  him  who  had 
been  born  blind.  It  was  not  an  expedient  to  remedy  an 
oversight,  "but  that  the  works  of  God  should  be  made 
manifest  in  him."  And  also  of  the  sickness,  death  and 
resurrection  of  Lazarus.  "  This  sickness  is  not  unto  death, 
but  for  the  glory  of  God,  that  the  Son  of  God  might  be 
glorified  thereby." 

I  think  the  object  in  the  performance  of  most,  if  not  all, 
the  miracles  recorded  in  Scripture  was,  not  the  accom- 
plishment of  an  end  by  a  special  interposition  of  divine 
power  which  might  have  been  accomplished  by  natural 
means,  but  to  prove  to  men  that  those  by  whom  the 
miracles  were,  or  seemed  to  be  wrought,  were  acting  and 
teaching  by  the  authority  of  God.  The  chief  object  of 
the  miracles  was,  to  prove  to  men  that  God  had  sent  those 


ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  43 

who  wrought  them,  as  teachers.  And,  according  to  the  laws 
of  the  human  mind,  this  was  the  sures1:,  if  not  the  only, 
way  of  giving  men  the  certainty  of  their  divine  mission. 

If  this  be  so,  then  those  miracles  by  which  God  has, 
from  time  to  time,  set  his  seal  to  the  teachings  of  those 
whom  He  has  commissioned  to  make  known  His  will  to 
their  fellows,  instead  of  being  a  sort  of  patchwork, 
filling  up  the  imperfections  of  the  original  arrange- 
ment, form  a  very  important  part  of  it. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said,  the  providence  of 
God  is  not  a  number  of  events  produced  by  special  efforts 
and  interferences  with  established  laws  without  any  con- 
nection with  each  other  or  with  anything  else  in  creation, 
each  emanating  directly  from  God,  no  one  of  them  offer- 
ing the  slightest  clue  by  which  we  may  conjecture  what 
the  next  will  be.  Nor  does  it  consist  of  a  number  of  ex- 
pedients interspersed  among  the  events  produced  by  the 
laws  of  nature,  adopted  to  supply  defects  in  the  orig- 
inal arrangement,  to  accomplish  purposes  foreseen  but  not 
adequately  provided  for,  or  which  were  not  foreseen,  but 
brqught  to  mind  in  the  progress  of  events,  and  then  added 
to  the  primary  scheme,  and  produced  by  special  exertions 
and  interferences. 

God's  providence  consists,  first,  of  the  formation  of  the 
conception  of  the  whole  universe,  taking  into  that  concep- 
tion every  existence,  great  and  small,  even  the  hairs  of 
our  head,  and  every  event,  even  the  falling  of  a  sparrow: 
secondly,  of  the  adjustment  of  all  the  laws,  tendencies 
and  properties  of  all  things  in  the  cieation  with  reference 
to  the  production  of  each  of  these  beings  and  events: 
thirdly,  of  the  regular  superintendence  and  execution  of 
all  those  laws,  of  maintaining  the  unbroken  connection 
between  cause  and  effect,  means  and  ends — in  short,  of 
the  strict  preservation  of  the  order  of  nature  as  at  first 
established. 

One   event  is  a  more  remarkable  providence  than  an- 


44  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

other  in  no  other  sense  than  a  mountain  is  more  remarka- 
ble than  a  hill.  A  mountain  is  more  remarkable  than 
a  hill,  not  because  it  is  composed  of  different  mate- 
rials, or  rests  upon  a  different  foundation,  or  sprung 
from  a  different  source  ;  but  because  it  is  larger  and  rarer. 
So  some  events  are  remarkable  providences,  not  because 
God  produces  others  by  the  instrumentality  of  natural 
laws,  and  these  by  the  direct  exertion  of  His  power;  nor 
because  He  produces  others  by  a  sort  of  general  superin- 
tendence of  the  laws  of  nature,  such  as  a  king  gives  to  the 
affairs  of  his  kingdom,  and  these  by  giving  special  and 
peculiar  attention  to  those  laws,  as  a  king  sometimes  does 
to  the  laws  of  the  realm  in  order  to  accomplish  some 
event  in  which  he  feels  peculiarly  interested.  Some  events 
may  be  called  special  providences,  because  by  their  rarity, 
their  intrinsic  or  relative  importance,  or  for  some  other 
reason,  they  attract  special  attention.  The  breath  we 
draw  at  every  moment  is  as  truly  an  event  of  God's  prov- 
idence, and  has  as  really  His  special  attention,  as  the 
greatest  event  that  ever  was  produced  by  that  providence. 

The  explanation  here  given  evidently  obliterates  .the 
distinction  sometimes  drawn  between  general  and  partic- 
ular providence.  It  is  general,  because  it  comprehends  all 
things,  great  and  small,  mind  and  matter,'  beings  and 
events.  It  is  particular,  because  no  being  or  event  is  so 
minute  or  trivial  as  to  be  beneath  the  notice  or  beyond 
the  superintendence  of  God,  nor  any  so  vast  as  to  be  be- 
yond his  comprehension  and  control. 

I  will  close  this  discussion  with  a  few  practical  remarks. 

I.  How  great  are  the  folly  and  presumption  of  those 
persons  who  speak  so  much  of  trusting  in  providence, 
and  make  that  trust  an  excuse  for  neglecting  the  use 
of  the  means  which  God  has  put  into  their  power  for  the 
attainment  of  the  ends  they  wish?  The  providence  of 
God  is  nothing  else  but  the  establishment  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  connection  between  means  and   ends,  cause 


;SAYS— THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  45 

and  effect.  But  those  people  seem  to  consider  them- 
selves as  reposing  uncommon  trust  in  that  providence, 
when  they  make  no  effort  to  attain  their  purposes  in  the 
providential  way,  and  expect  that  God  will  do  it  for  them 
miraculously,  by  breaking  the  connection  in  whose  main- 
tenance His  providence  consists. 

2.  The  same  may  be  said  of  those  who  are  supinely 
waiting  to  be  converted,  instead  of  earnestly  using  the 
means  and  following  the  directions  that  God  has  given. 
Although  there  is  a  direct  exertion  of  divine  power  in  our 
regeneration,  yet  we  are  not  merely  passive  recipients. 
God  has  assigned  us  our  part  to  perform,  and  in  following 
His  directions  in  order  to  attain  eternal  life  we  are  as 
clearly  availing  ourselves  of  His  providence  as  when  we 
seek  wealth  by  industry  and  economy.  And  in  neglect- 
ing these  directions  and  waiting  for  God  to  convert  us 
without  means,  we  are  as  guilty  of  presumption  as  one  who 
expends  his  time  in  idleness  and  his  money  in  extrava- 
gance, and  expects  that  God  will  bestow  wealth  upon  him 
without  his  exertion. 

3.-  The  providence  of  God  is  a  very  uncertain  guide  in 
matters  of  duty.  The  little  that  we  see  is  but  an  infini- 
tesimally  .small  part  of  a  scheme  so  vast  that  nothing  less 
than  infinite  wisdom  can  fully  comprehend  it.  And  it  is 
impossible  completely  to  understand  a  part  without  un- 
derstanding its  relation  to  the  whole.  And  that  relation 
cannot  be  perfectly  understood  without  understanding  the 
whole.  When  two  courses  of  conduct  are  open  before  us, 
if  we  consult  simply  the  providence  of  God,  I  suppose  the 
only  question  would  be,  which,  according  to  the  light  now 
before  us,  is  most  for  our  advantage  ?  But  there  is  an- 
other question  which  we  ought  to  ask,  viz :  are  they 
equally  free  from  infringement  on  any  specific  command 
or  any  general  principle  of  Scripture?  If  so,  we  may 
conclude  that  the  greater  advantage  is  a  providential 
indication  of  the  course  we  ought  to  pursue.   But  if  either 


46  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

or  both  conflict  with  any  portion  of  the  word  of  God,  we 
should  remember  that  He  has  given  us  "  His  word  as  a 
lamp  to  our  feet  and  a  light  to  our  path,"  because  we  are 
not  always  competent  to  interpret  His  providence.  There- 
fore, when  there  is  an  apparent  collision  between  the  two 
modes  of  learning  our  duty,  we  should  certainly  follow  the 
clearer  light,  and  believe  that  the  apparent  contradiction 
arises  from  our  incapacity  to  understand  the  more  ob- 
scure. 

4.  How  strong  a  consolation,  and  how  sure  a  support 
does  this  view  of  divine  providence  afford  to  the  Christian 
who  really  trusts  in  God's  providence  !  If  events  happened 
by  blind  chance,  or  were  governed  by  a  being  hostile  or  even 
indifferent  to  his  interest,  he  would  have  nothing  to  de- 
pend on  for  safety  but'  his  own  short-sighted  and  erring 
sagacity.  But  now  the  "One  Lawgiver,"  the  omniscient, 
omnipotent  Ruler,  "  who  worketh  all  things  after  the 
counsel  of  His  own  will,"  is  his  friend  and  protector,  and 
has  assured  him  that  "all  things  work  together  for  good 
to  them  that  love  God."  Therefore,  "  in  all  his  ways  he 
acknowledges"  God,  knowing  that  "He  will  direct  his 
paths."  And  in  the  deepest  affliction  he  can  say : 
"  Though  He  slay  me,  yet  will  I  trust  in  Him." 

Of  this  consolation  those  are  destitute  who  believe  that 
some  things  happen  otherwise  than  according  to  the  prov- 
idence of  God.  In  the  hour  of  affliction  they  know  not 
whether  to  say:  "  I  opened  not  my  mouth,  because  Thou 
didst  it."  or  with  the  idolatrous  Philistines :"  It  was  a 
chance  that  happened  to  us."  What  they  suppose  to  be 
submission  to  His  providence  may  be  submission  to 
chance  or  something  else,  since  they  have  no  means  of 
distinguishing  the  events  brought  to  pass  by  providence 
from  those  that  happen  independently  of  it. 

5.  Finally,  those  exercise  a  confidence  for  which  they 
have  no  warrant,  either  in  Scripture  or  in  the  history  of 
our  race,  who  expect  that  providence  will  certainly  favor 


ESSAYS— THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  47 

them  in  this  or  that  enterprise,  even  though  it  may  be 
right.  Although  we  are  warranted  in  expecting  most 
confidently  that  "  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  will  do  right." 
and  are  therefore  authorized  to  expect  the  ultimate  tri- 
umph of  the  right  in  every  part  of  His  all-pervading  gov- 
ernment, yet  Scripture,  history  and  experience  combine 
to  teach  us  that  "  sentence  against  an  evil  work  is  not 
executed  speedily,"  and  that  God  often  "chooses  His 
people  in  a  furnace  of  affliction."  Although  "godliness 
is  profitable  unto  all  things,  having  promise  of  the 
life  that  now  is,  and  also  of  that  which  is  to  come;" 
although  the  structure  of  human  society  and  the  general 
tendency  of  things  are  in  favor  of  virtue  and  the  virtuous; 
yet  Scripture  combines  with  the  general  course  of  human 
affairs  to  teach  all  who  are  open  to  instruction,  that  the 
present  life  is  not  a  state  of  adequate  and  uniform  rewards 
and  punishments.  In  many  cases  a  wicked  man  is  far 
more  successful  in  all  temporal  affairs,  and  so  continues 
to  the  day  of  his  death,  than  his  pious  and  excellent 
neighbor.  "  They  are  not  in  trouble  as  other  men." 
"  There  are  no  bands  in  their  death  ;  but  their  strength  is 
firm."  We  are  warranted  to  hope  for  the  success  of  a  given 
enterprise  because  it  is  right.  But  to  hold  that  the  di- 
vine government  stands  pledged  for  its  success,  is  simply 
to  believe  that  its  pledges  are  forfeited  in  thousands  of 
instances.  The  present  life  is  not  intended  adequately 
and  uniformly  to  reward  virtue  and  punish  vice,  but  in 
general,  to  encourage  virtue  and  discourage  vice,  and  thus 
to  be  a  state  of  discipline,  and  to  give  scope  for  the  exercise 
of  faith  or  belief  that  "  when  that  which  is  perfect  is 
come,  that  which  is  in  part  shall  be  done  away."  We  have 
a  few  general  pledges;  e.  g.,  the  covenant  made  with  Noah 
for  the  continuance  of  seed-time  and  harvest,  and  that  the 
world  should  not  again  perish  by  water;  and  also  Christ's 
promise  of  the  preservation  of  His  church.  But  we  have 
none  for  the  success  of  particular  schemes,  the  preserva- 


48  ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  of  our  lives,  etc.  But  we  have  the  assurance,  that 
these  will  be  prospered  and  preserved  in  so  far  as  that 
prosperity  and  preservation  are  seen  by  Infinite  Wisdom 
to  be  for  our  real  good.  But  for  our  complete  and  mani- 
fest triumph,  we  must  be  concent  to  wait  in  the  exercise 
of  faith,  until  God  shall  "  give  to  every  man  according  as 
his  work  shall  be." 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  49 


ESSAY  THIRD.— PRAYER. 


It  may  appear  to  some  that  the  theory  of  providence  I 
have  developed,  as  being  the  strict  execution  of  a  plan 
formed  in  eternity,  leaves  no  room  for  the  answer  of 
prayer  offered  in  time.  It  may  be  said,  if  the  thing  pray- 
ed for  should  happen  to  be  a  part  of  the  great  scheme  of 
providence,  it  will  be  done  whether  we  pray  for  it  or  not. 
Prayer  is  therefore  useless.  If  we  pray  for  what  is  not 
included  in  this  general  scheme,  then  it  cannot  be  answer- 
ed without  a  miracle,  for  whatever  is  done  independently 
of  the  course  of  nature  is  a  miracle,  according  to  the  defini- 
tion already  given.  But  the  object  for  which  miracles  have 
been  wrought  among  men,  viz:  the  divine  attestation  of 
some  revelation  which  God  wished  to  make  to  men  con- 
cerning some  portion  of  His  will, — that  object  no  longer 
exists,  for  the  canon  of  Scripture  is  completed,  and  reve- 
lation forever  closed.  There  is  therefore  no  reason  to 
expect  that  God  will  answer  prayer  miraculously.  But  if 
prayer  be  not  answered  providentially  or  miraculously,  it 
cannot  be  answered  at  all ;  for  these,  it  has  been  shown, 
are  the  only  two  modes  in  which  God  ever  acts,  so  far  as 
we  know. 

Such  objections  may  be  urged  with  great  plausibility 
against  the  doctrine  of  a  pre-existing  plan  according  to 
which  God  works.  I  think  they  might  be  indirectly  but 
completely  answered  by  showing  that  the  denial  of  the 
doctrine  would  lead  to  still  greater  difficulties.  But  I 
think  they  may  be  directly  and  unanswerably  answered 
by  a  perfect  solution  of  the  difficulties  which  the  doctrine 
is  supposed  to  involve.     This  may  be  done — 

1.  From  the  foreknowledge  of  God.    Our  foreknowledge 


50  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

is,  generally,  very  imperfect.  And  yet  even  our  imperfect 
knowledge  of  the  future  often  leads  us  to  make  prepara- 
tion, in  the  arrangement  of  our  plans,  for  the  granting  of  a 
request  which  we  suppose  will  be  presented  to  us  at  some 
future  time.  Will  any  one  think  of  saying  that  the  pre- 
senting of  the  request  is  useless,  because  we  have  already 
arranged  to  do  the  thing  which  the  expected  petitioner 
desires?  Is  it  not  plain  that  the  presenting  and  the  grant- 
ing of  the  petition  are  as  strictly  counterparts  and  correla- 
tives of  each  other  as  if  no  preparation  for  the  perform- 
ance of  the  given  act  had  been  made  until  the  request 
was  offered  ?  If  the  arrangement  for  doing  a  certain  thing 
be  made  with  respect  to  a  request,  and  as  an  answer  to  it, 
surely  the  date  of  that  preparation,  as  being  before  or 
after  the  presentation,  cannot  affect  the  relation  of  the 
request  and  the  answer  as  being  correlatives  of  each  other. 
Now  let  it  be  granted,  as  surely  it  will,  that  God  knew 
before  1  le  began  the  work  of  creation  what  prayers  would 
be  offered  to  Him  in  time,  without  at  all  considering  how 
IK  knows.  Suppose  that  He  then,  in  eternity,  determined 
which  of  all  these  foreseen  prayers  He  would  grant,  and 
took  in  the  events  which  were  to  be  brought  to  pass  in 
answer  to  each  of  them  into  the  general  scheme  of  prov- 
idence, and  arranged  the  laws  of  the  universe,  mind  and 
matter,  with  reference  to  these  as  well  as  to  all  other 
events.  Is  there  anything  in  this  pre-arrangement,  to 
destroy  the  relation  between  the  prayers  and  the  an- 
swers as  counterparts  of  each  other?  Were  a  prayer 
offered  which  God  had  not  foreseen,  and  were  He  to  an- 
swer it  by  resorting  to  some  expedient  or  by-end,  every 
one  would  see  the  relation  between  the  prayer  and  the 
answer,  and  that  the  offering  of  it  was  not  useless.  Why 
then  should  the  date  of  the  preparation  for  the  answer,  as 
being  before  instead  of  after  the  presentation,  be  thought 
to  affect  that  relation?  It  thus  appears  to  me  that  no 
broader   premises  than   the  acknowledgement   that  God 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  51. 

foresaw  in  eternity  what  prayers  would  be  offered  to  Him 
in  time — no  broader  premises  than  this  admission  are 
necessary  to  show,  beyond  contradiction,  that  the  theory 
of  providence  which  has  been  developed  does  leave  room, 
and  make  provision,  for  the  answer  of  prayer.     But — 

2.  When  we  take  in,  not  only  God's  foreknowledge  of 
the  prayers  that  are  to  be  offered,  but  His  agency  in  di- 
recting them,  we  shall  see  still  more  completely  the  room 
which  the  theory  of  providence  leaves,  and  the  provision 
which  it  makes,  for  the  answer  of  prayer. 

Of  the  two  extreme  opinions  upon  the  subject  of  prayer, 
held  by  those  who  have  thought  enough  on  the  subject 
to  have  any  settled  opinions,  one  is  fatalism,  which  teaches 
that  each  event  is  decreed  and  brought  to  pass  without 
any  connection  with  any  other.  There  is  a  vast  difference 
between  the  doctrine  of  fatalism  and  the  scheme  of  prov- 
idence which  I  have  developed.  The  difference  is  this  : 
the  theory  of  providence  represents  God  as  maintaining 
the  connection  between  causes  and  effects,  and  thus  makes 
everything,  except  miracles,  dependent  on  second  cau  es. 
The  doctrine  of  fatalism  destroys  this  connection  and 
dependence,  and  makes  every  event  directly  dependent 
on  the  exertion  of  divine  or  some  undefinable  power. 
Fatalism  makes  every  event  miraculous.  These  two  doc- 
trines— fatalism  and  the  unalterable  course  of  nature 
— which  are  sometimes  confounded,  are  as  different  as  can 
be  imagined. 

The  other  extreme  opinion  is,  that  our  prayers  really 
produce  a  change  in  the  mind  of  God,  as  one  man  may  in 
the  mind  of  another,  either  by  suggesting  actions  of  which 
he  had  not  thought;  or  by  presenting  new  motives  and  in- 
ducements to  do  what  he  had  thought  of,  but  had  not 
determined  to  do;  or  by  using  one's  personal  influence  to 
urge  another  in  a  course  of  action  to  which  he  was  not 
before  inclined.  This  opinion  is,  that  we  do  somehow  or 
other  induce  God  to  do  what  he  did  not  before  intend  to 
do. 


52  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

I  will  examine  these  two  extremes  of  fatalism  and  of 
our  changing  the  mind  of  God  by  our  prayers,  and  then 
give  what  I  think  to  be  the  true  theory  of  prayer. 

Fatalism,  by  denying  the  existence  of  any  such  thing 
as  second  causes,  makes  prayer,  and  indeed  exertion  of 
any  sort,  useless.  If  there  be  no  causal  relation  between 
any  two  events,  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  do  one 
thing  in  order  that  another  may  happen.  To  expect  that 
any  event  will  be  accomplished  because  we  pray  for  it, 
is  a  p'ain  denial  of  the  doctrine  of  fatalism  :  for  if  any- 
thing is  done  in  answer  to  prayer,  this  is  only  another 
way  of  saying  that  there  is  a  causal  connection  between 
the  prayer  and  the  event  which  is  accomplished  in  answer 
to  it.* 

That  no  one  consistently  holds  this  doctrine  is  clear 
from  the  fact  that  no  one  acts  upon  it,  except  in  those 
cases  where  he  wishes  an  excuse.  Even  the  Arabs,  who, 
it  is  said,  approach  to  the  very  mouth  of  a  cannon  as  con- 
fidently as  if  it  were  harmless,  in  full  belief  that  fate  has 
fixed  the  term  of  their  lives,  and  it  cannot  by  any  means 
be  shortened — even  they  do  not  attempt  to  carry 
it  into  practice  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.  Indeed,  the 
man  or  race  that  would  attempt  this  would  soon  be  among 
the  things  that  were. 

Its  absurdity  is  still  further  shown  by  the  fact  of  its 
direct  antagonism  to  our  daily  experience,  and  indeed  to 
the  whole   course  of  nature.     That  whole   course  shows 

*This  expression,  causal  connection  or  relation,  may  be  taken  in  several  different 
senses.  First,  that  one  thing  is  the  efficient  cause  of  another.  The  sun  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  day-light.  Secondly,  what  is  technically  called  causa  sine  qua  non,  an  indispensa- 
ble condition  of  the  happening  of  an  event.  In  a  cloudy  day,  the  removal  of  the  clouds 
is  an  indispensable  condition  of  our  having  clear  light.  That  removal  does  not  directly 
and  efficiently  produce  the  light  ;  they  might  be  removed,  and  yet  the  world  remain  in 
darkness,  if  the  sun,  the  direct  and  efficient  cause,  be  absent.  The  third  I  will  call  indirect; 
as  when  one  does  a  thing  because  another  asks  him  to  do  it.  The  request  manifestly  has 
not  the  relation  to  the  event  which  the  sun  has  to  day-light,  direct  and  efficient,  nor  is  it 
a  sine  qua  non,  for  the  other  might  do  it  without  the  request.  And  yet  there  is  a  causal 
relation  ;  for  he  would  not  do  it  without  the  request,  and  does  it  because  of  the  request. 
I  here  use  it  in  this  last  sense.  I  do  not  say  this  is  a  complete  enumeration  of  causal  re- 
lations, but  it  is  sufficient  for  my  present  purpose. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY.  53 

that  things  and  events  do  not  spring  segregated  and  un- 
connected, from  the  decree  of  fate  put  forth  in  action,  but 
that  they  all  form  a  system,  the  several  parts  of  which  are 
connected  and  dependent,  and  that  the  connection  be- 
tween cause  and  effect  binds  the  whole  together.  This 
doctrine  of  fatalism  would  sever  these  two  things,  cause 
and  effect,  which  God  has  joined  together,  and  which  all 
men  see  and  know,  except  when  they  are  acting  under  the 
delusion  of  superstition,  passion  or  some  other,  to  be  in- 
separably joined.  Indeed,  without  this  connection,  we 
should  be  utterly  and  hopelessly  at  sea  upon  all  subjects  : 
for  experience  and  observation  could  give  us  nothing  but 
an  accumulating  mass  of  isolated  facts,  forming  an  intol- 
erable burden  upon  the  memory,  all  utterly  worthless, 
because  no  inference  whatever  could  be  drawn  from  any 
number  of  them,  as  to  what  would,  under  given  circum- 
stances, happen  again.  To  know  that  a  given  event,  or 
any  number  of  events,  happened,  without  any  knowledge 
of  their  connection  with  what  preceded  them  in  nature  as 
their  causes,  or  what  followed  them  as  effects,  is  as  use- 
less as  the  knowledge  of  a  number  of  words  from  a  for- 
eign language  without  knowing  what  they  mean,  or  how 
they  are  formed  into  sentences.  All  the  practical  rules  of 
life,  and  the  principles  of  all  the  sciences  (mathematics 
being  the  only  exception  that  occurs  to  me)  are  nothing 
else  but  generalizations,  formed  from  numerous  facts  col- 
lected by  observation  and  experience,  all  considered  on 
the  supposition,  which  appears  to  be  a  sort  of  instinct  in 
our  nature,  that  similar  events  will  happen  in  a  similar 
conjuncture  of  circumstances.  But  if  each  event  were 
determined  in  the  Divine  Mind  without  reference  to  any 
other,  and  brought  to  pass  by  a  simple  impulse  of  divine 
energy,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  ac  what  we  under- 
stand by  system;  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  deduc- 
tion or  generalization  ;  nor  could  the  most  extended 
knowledge  of  facts  gathered  from  experience,  observation 


54  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  reading,  furnish  the  slightest  ground  for  a  guess  or 
conjecture  as  to  what  would  hereafter  happen.  We  should 
simply  know  that  the  divine  energy  had  acted  thus  or  so  ; 
but  as  God  is  not  controlled  by  circumstances,  we  could 
not  conjecture  with  any  sort  of  probability  how  He  would 
hereafter  act. 

The  other  extreme,  that  our  prayers  produce  a  change 
in  the  Divine  Mind  is  so  utterly  contrary  to  all  our  con- 
ceptions and  the  Scriptural  representations  of  the  Divine 
Being,  and  so  shocking  to  the  moral  sensibility,  as  scarcely 
to  deserve  serious  consideration.  That  the  creature 
should  originate  an  impulse  which  can  put  new  purposes 
into  the  mind  of  the  Creator,  is  clearly  impossible  :  for 
the  capability  of  being  moved  by  mere  sympathy,  without 
any  rational  motive,  is  allowed  by  all  to  be  a  weakness. 
And  none  will  attribute  weakness  to  the  Almighty.  And 
that  any  new  motive  or  inducement  can  be  presented  to 
God  is  impossible;  because  He  already  knows  all  things. 

I  think  I  have  said  quite  enough  on  these  two  extremes, 
I  shall  now  give  what  I  think  to  be  the  true  theory  of 
prayer. 

It  is  not  a  cause,  originating  with  us,  by  means  of  which 
we  produce  a  change  in  the  mind  of  God,  "  with  whom  is 
no  variableness,  neither  shadow  of  turning."  But  it  is  the 
effect  of  a  change  which  He,  by  the  agency  of  His  Spirit, 
produces  in  us.  "Likewise  the  Spirit  also  helpeth  our 
infirmities:  for  we  know  not  what  we  should  pray  for  as 
we  ought:  but  the  Spirit  itself  rnaketh  intercession  for  us 
with  groanings  which  cannot  be  uttered."  The  positions 
of  the  four  persons  concerned  in  every  real,  faithful  prayer, 
may  be  illustrated  by  a  reference  to  the  law  of  England. 
There,  two'  offices  which  are  combined  in  the  lawyer  of 
our  country,  are  divided  between  the  attorney  and  the 
advocate  or  barrister.  It  is  the  office  of  the  attorney  to 
take  the  testimony,  prepare  the  papers,  instruct  the  client— 
in  a  word,  to  prepare  the  business  for  the  advocate.  When 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  55 

thus  prepared,  the  client  puts  the  whole  into  the  hands  of 
the  advocate,  who  conducts  the  matter  in  court.  The 
court  decides  the  case,  granting  or  refusing  the  claims  of 
the  client.  The  client  knows  not  how  to  prepare  his  suit, 
as  "  we  know  not  what  we  should  pray  for  as  we  ought." 
But  the  attorney  directs  him,  as  "the  Spirit  helpeth  our 
infirmities."  He  makes  out  the  papers  for  him,  as  "the 
Spirit  itself  maketh  intercession  for  us."  But  even  when 
thus  prepared  and  instructed,  the  client  does  not  conduct 
his  own  case  through  court.  This  is  done  for  him  by  the 
advocate.  So,  "  if  any  man  sin,  we  have  an  advocate  with 
the  Father,  Jesus  Christ  the  righteous;"  "who  is  even  at 
the  right  hand  of  God,  who  also  maketh  intercession  for 
us."  But  here  the  analogy  is  incomplete — gloriously  incom- 
plete. The  ablest  advocate  on  earth  may.sometimes  lose 
a  case  committed  to  his  care.  But  "the  Father,"  who  is 
represented  in  the  analogy  by  the  court,  "  heareth  the 
Son  always."  "  He  is  therefore  able  to  keep  that  which 
we  commit  unto  Him." 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said.  If  it  be  granted  that 
God  knew  in  eternity  what  prayers  would  be  offered  in 
time,  this  alone  is  sufficient  to  show  how  perfectly  the 
answer  of  prayer  harmonizes  with  the  existence  of  an 
eternal  plan  by  which  all  things  are  done.  If  God  saw  in 
the  beginning  that  a  certain  event  would  be  prayed  for, 
and  arranged  the  course  of  nature  so  as  to  bring  it  to  pass 
at  the  time  and  place  to  be  specified  in  the  prayer,  this 
putting  of  it  into  the  course  of  nature  surely  has  no  more 
power  to  destroy  the  usefulness  and  efficacy  of  prayer 
than  if  the  arrangement  for  bringing  it  to  pass  were  made 
after  the  presenting  of  the  prayer.  The  question  which 
determines  the  efficacy  of  prayer  is,  not  when  did  God 
determine  to  cause  a  certain  event — before  or  after  it  was 
prayed  for?  but  why  does  He  cause  it — in  answer  to  the 
petition  that  it  may  be  done,  or  without  regard  to  that 
petition  ?     If   it  is   done  in  answer  to   prayer,  then   the 


56  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

prayer  is  efficacious,  whether  the  event  was  a  part  of  the 
great  scheme  for  the  creation  and  government  of  the  uni- 
verse, or  a  piece  of  patchwork  added  after  the  prayer  was 
offered.  Thus  much  from  the  simple  admission  of  the 
foreknowledge  of  God,  without  at  all  inquiring  how  He 
knows  what  prayers  will  be  offered. 

But  when  we  consider  that  the  Holy  "  Spirit  itself 
maketh  intercession  for  us,"  teaching  us  "  what  we  should 
pray  for  as  we  ought,"  we  see,  not  how  God  may  adapt 
His  ways  to  our  requests,  but  that  it  is  only  necessary  for 
Him  to  adapt  one  part  of  His  government  to  another  part. 
If  it  be  so  that  we  pray  according  to  the  mind  of  the 
Spirit,  then  both  the  prayer  and  the  answer  to  it  are  from 
the  same  source.  Prayer  then  is  not  a  cause  by  which  we 
produce  a  change  in  the  mind  of  God,  but  an  effect  spring- 
ing from  a  change  which  He  produces  in  us.  It  is  not  a 
work  of  dictation,  but  of  subordination  to  the  Divine 
Mind.  The  three  Persons  of  the  adorable  Trinity,  who 
work  and  have  worked  from  eternity  in  perfect  harmony, 
are  engaged  in  suggesting,  offering  and  answering  the 
prayer  of  faith.  God,  then,  is  not  only  "  the  Author  and 
Finisher  of  faith,"  but  of  every  prayer  offered  in  faith. 

Thus,  when  we  take,  not  a  partial  or  one-sided,  but  a 
full-orbed  view  of  the  truth  which  the  Scriptures  teach  on 
this  subject,  so  far  are  we  from  finding  any  discrepancy 
between  the  efficacy  of  prayer  and  the  eternal  and  uni- 
form government  of  God,  that  we  see  the  three  Persons  of 
the  triune  God  executing  in  time  the  eternal  purpose 
"  which  he  purposed  in  himself."     Thus,  his 

"  Eternal  thought  moves  on 
His  undisturbed  affairs." 

It  is,  then,  not  a  mere  poetic  fiction,  but  the  teaching  of 

the  Word  of  God,  that 

"  Prayer  is  the  breath  of  God  in  man, 
Returning  whence  it  came." 

Now,  upon  what  supposable  condition  is  it  possible  for 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  S7 

prayer  to  fail  to  be  answered  ?  There  are  two.  First,  if 
the  Holy  Spirit  should  suggest  a  prayer  which  the  Son  is 
unwilling  to  present,  that  prayer  must  fail;  as  a  suit  must 
fail,  if,  after  the  attorney  has  prepared  it  for  court,  the  ad- 
vocate should  refuse  to  bring  it  into  court.  Secondly,  if 
the  Spirit  should  suggest,  and  the  Son  offer,  a  request 
which  the  Father  is  not  willing  to  grant,  then  the  prayer 
must  fail  to  be  answered  ;  as  a  suit  must  be  lost  in  an 
earthly  court,  if,  after  it  is  prepared  by  the  attorney  and 
brought  into  court  by  the  advocate,  the  court  is  not  will- 
ing to  grant  it.  But  if  the  attorney,  the  advocate  and  the 
judge  be  agreed,  the  suit  must  of  necessity  prevail.  So, 
if  the  three  Persons  of  the  Trinity  be  one  God,  and  of 
one  mind,  prayers  suggested  by  one  and  offered  by 
another  must  be  granted  by  the  other.  Schism  in  the 
Trinity  is  the  only  supposable  cause  which  can  thwart 
the  efficacy  of  prayer.  If  this  be  impossible,  as  surely  it 
is,  quite  as  impossible  as  for  the  right  hand  to  contend 
with  the  left,  then  every  prayer  of  faith  must  necessarily 
be  answered. 

Shall  an}-  one  say,  then,  that  everything  which  we  ask  of 
God  will  be  done?  Our  experience  teaches  us,  and  re- 
peats the  lesson  again  and  again,  that  this  is  not  true  in 
fact.  And  no  theory  can  stand  against  facts.  Is  this  fact 
then  necessarily  opposed  to  the  theory  I  have  developed  ? 
If  so,  the  theory,  however  plausible,  must  be  renounced. 
But  if  a  cause  is  lost  in  an  English  court,  does  this  fact 
necessarily  prove  that  there  is  a  disagreement  between 
the  attorney,  the  advocate  and  the  court?  May  not  the 
client  defeat  his  cause  by  refusing  or  neglecting  to  follow 
the  directions  of  the  attorney  ?  And  if  the  advocate  is  not 
willing  to  undertake  the  case,  does  that  necessarily  prove 
that  he  and  the  attorney  do  not  agree  in  their  opin- 
ions of  that  case?  Perhaps  the  attorney  would  have  told 
the  client  that  his  case  was  hopeless,  had  he  but  consulted 
him.     Again,  it  is  possible  for  one  to  attempt  to  conduct 


58  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  own  case  without  consulting  either  attorney  or  advo- 
cate. And  if  the  court  throws  out  the  case  or  decides 
against  him,  this  is  surely  no  evidence  that  the  court  holds 
a  different  opinion  of  the  law  as  to  this  case  from  that  of 
the  attorney  or  the  advocate.  The  mere  loss  of  a  case 
does  not  prove  that  there  is  any  difference  among  these 
three  personages.  In  order  to  prove  a  difference  among 
them,  it  mast  be  shown  that  one,  in  his  official  capacity 
took  up  and  forwarded  the  case  as  far  as  his  jurisdiction 
reached,  and  that  it  was  arrested  in  the  next  stage  of  its 
progress  by  the  person  into  whose  hands  it  then  went ;  as 
that  the  advocate  refused  to  prosecute  what  the  attorney 
had  begun,  or  the  court  refused  to  grant  what  the  advo- 
cate asked. 

So  we  often  "ask  and  receive  not  because  we  ask  amiss, 
that  we  may  consume  it  upon  our  lusts."  We  consult  our 
depraved  natures  and  ask  whatever  they  demand,  instead 
of  seeking  and  following  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
And  I  am  afraid  we  too  often  forget  the  mediation  of 
Christ  and  present  our  prayers  without  any  regard  to  it ;  and 
then  at  the  close,  perhaps  more  from  habit  than  anything 
else,  we  say  "for  Christ's  sake."  The  failure  of  such  pray- 
ers by  no  means  affects  the  efficacy  of  prayer  properly 
prepared  and  offered.  "  Verily,  verily  I  say  unto  you," 
says  Christ,  "  whatsoever  ye  shall  ask  the  Father  in  my 
name  He  will  give  you." 

But  many  things  are  prayed  for  that  are  not  done.  Very 
true,  and  many  things  are  asked  of  earthly  parents  that 
are  not  granted.  These,  however,  do  not  disprove  the 
efficacy  of  such  requests.  God  is  a  father,  and  decides 
what  petitions  to  grant  and  what  to  withhold.  The  real- 
ity, not  the  uniformity  of  the  answer  to  prayer,  I  have  at- 
tempted to  show. 


ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY.  59 


ESSAY  FOURTH.— THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD 
AND  THE   LIBERTY  OF  MAN. 


I  once  saw  a  number  of  small  pieces  of  wood  cut  into 
different  and  strange  shapes,  and  was  told  that  when  prop- 
erly placed  together  they  would  form  an  exact  square, 
each  part  fitting  its  place  almost  as  well  as  if  the  whole 
had  been  a  square  originally  and  then  cut  into  parts  with- 
out wasting  anything,  and  those  parts  again  placed  in  their 
original  positions.  Having  repeatedly  tried  to  arrange  the 
parts,  and  having  failed  as  often,  I  was  compelled  to  ac- 
knowledge that  I  could  not  so  place  them  as  to  make  them 
all  mutually  fit.  Yet  I  did  not  doubt  that  they  were  ca- 
pable of  such  arrangement,  having  been  assured  by  a  per- 
son in  whose  veracity  I  had  full  confidence,  that  they 
could  be  so  placed.  I  attributed  the  failure  to  my  own 
ignorance. 

Thus,  as  was  remarked  in  a  former  Essay,  when  two 
truths  are  proved,  each  by  satisfactory  evidence,  we 
should  believe  them  to  be  reconcilable,  even  though  our 
repeated  efforts  should  fail  to  place  them  in  such  mutual 
relation  that  we  can  see  their  consistency :  for  it  is  self- 
evident  that  two  truths  cannot  contradict  each  other.  But 
if  one  is  willing  to  persevere  in  attempting  to  arrange  the 
parts  of  a  puzzle,  after  repeated  failures,  much  more  should 
he  continue  earnestly  to  seek  for  the  reconciliation  of  ap- 
parently contradictory  truths.  And  although  others 
should  regard  every  effort  as  a  failure,  still  he  should  be 
commended  as  a  lover  of  truth,  rather  than  censured  as 
being  presumptuous. 

That  God  "  doeth  according  to  His  will  in  the  army  of 
heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth,"  is  a  truth 


60  ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

repeatedly  and  unequivocally  taught  in  Scripture,  and  con- 
firmed, even  to  a  demonstration,  by  reason.  Nothing, 
therefore,  ought  to  shake  our  belief  of  it.  That  wc  are  mor- 
ally free,  is  another  truth  to  which  consciousness  directly 
and  unequivocally  testifies.  The  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness beine  the  highest  and  most  reliable  evidence  known 
to  us,  we  ought,  on  no  account  whatever,  to  allow  our  be- 
lief of  either  to  be  shaken. 

If  it  be  also  self-evident  that  two  truths  cannot  possibly 
contradict  each  other,  no  number  of  failures  to  bring  these 
two  into  such  mutual  relations  that  we  can  see  their  con- 
sistency, ought  to  lead  us  to  doubt  that  they,  in  them- 
selves, are  capable  of  such  arrangement. 

The  explanation  and  the  proof  of  God's  efficient  gov- 
ernment extending  over  the  acts  of  men,  have  been  given 
in  the  Essay  on  Providence.  It  remains  to  give  the  ex- 
planation of  human  liberty,  and  of  its  consistency  with 
the  divine  government.  It  is  not  necessary  to  attempt 
to  prove  the  existence  of  our  free-agency,  since  every  one 
has  the  evidence  in  his  own  consciousness.  I  must  ob- 
serve that  I  use  the  phrase,  the  Efficient  Government  of 
God,  in  preference  to  the  more  common  word  "  predestina- 
tion," because  it  more  directly  presents  the  difficulty  to  be 
removed.  The  thing  which  creates  the  apparent  difficulty 
is  the  fact  that  God  governs  us,  and  not  the  date  when 
He  determined  to  do  so  and  arranged  the  plan  upon 
which  He  would  conduct  that  government.  The  question 
is:  Does  He  govern  us?  Not:  When  did  he  determine 
to  do  so  ? 

My  plan  of  proceeding  is,  not  to  decide  certainly  what 
the  true  definition  of  liberty  is,  and  then  to  reconcile  this 
with  the  divine  government  ;  but  to  take  up  every  possible 
definition,  and  to  reconcile  each  one  successively  with  that 
government. 

The  first  definition  of  Free-Agency  that  I  shall  pre- 
sent is : 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY.  6l 

That  our  volitions  are  the  causes  of  our  actions.  This 
implies  freedom  from  constraint  and  restraint ;  that  we 
are  not  constrained  to  do  what  we  do  not  wish  to  do,  nor 
restrained  from  doing  what  we  do  wish  to  do.  This  is 
President  Edwards'  view  of  Moral   Liberty.* 

Let  us,  then,  for  the  present,  assume  that  the  essence 
of  free-agency  consists  in  the  causal  relation  between  one's 
actions  and  his  volitions.  Whoever,  then,  without  either 
compulsion  or  restraint,  does  as  he  chooses  and  because  he 
so  chooses,  is  a  free-agent.  Is  it  possible  for  God  to  gov- 
ern him  without  infringing  upon  his  freedom  in  either  of 
these  respects — restraint  or  constraint  ? 

If  we  wish  to  know  whether  one  was  a  free-agent  in  the 
performance  of  a  particular  act,  we  have  only  to  inquire 
whether  the  act  was  caused  by  the  application  of  external 
physical  force,  as  one  may  be  bound  to  a  vehicle  and  thus 
compelled  to  move,  or  as  one  may  strike  a  blow  under  the 
influence  of  electricity, — or  whether  it  was  caused  by  a  ner- 
vous affection,  which  sometimes  produces  motions  which 
may  be  very  important  in  their  effects, — or  whether  it  was 
caused  by  that  mental  phenomenon  (or  event,  if  the  word 
phenomenon  be  objected  to,)  which  we  call  a  volition. 
If  it  was  the  last,  this  determines,  without  further  ques- 
tioning, that  he  was  free  in  the  performance  of  the  given 
action. 

But,  although  no  further  questioning  is  necessary  to 
determine  the  fact  of  his  free-agency,  we  may  prosecute 
our  inquiry  further  for  another  purpose.  The  volition 
which  caused  the  action  was  itself  an  event  which  required 
a  cause,  as  much  so  as  any  other  event.  Suppose  we  find 
that  cause  to  be  compound,  consisting  in  part  of  the  inter- 
nal disposition  of  the  mind,  and  in  part  of  the  outward 
circumstances  by  which  the  actor  was  surrounded.  For 
example,  the  act  was  theft.  We  inquire,  what  caused  the 
act   of   taking  another's  property  ?     The  answer  is,   that 

*  Edwards  on  the  Will,  Part  i.  Sec.  5. 


62  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

mental  act  which  we  call  a  volition.  This  establishes  his 
free-agency,  according  to  the  definition  ;  and  here  our  in- 
quiry might  end,  were  we  simply  inquiring  whether  he 
was  a  free-agent  in  performing  that  act.  But  if  we  please, 
we  may  now  inquire,  what  caused  that  mental  phenome- 
non which  we  call  a  volition?  We  shall  find  it  to  have 
been  a  compound  cause,  consisting  of  an  avaricious  dispo- 
sition within,  and  an  opportunity  of  gratifying  it  without. 
Either  of  these  being  wanting,  the  volition  would  not 
have  occurred.  No  outward  opportunity  would  cause  a 
perfectly  honest  man  to  form  the  volition  to  steal  his 
neighbor's  property ;  nor  would  any  degree  of  avarice 
cause  a  man  to  determine  to  steal  a  given  article,  unless 
there  were  an  opportunity,  or  at  least  the  appearance  of 
one,  of  executing  that  volition. 

I  would  here  remark,  that  there  is  a  wide  difference  be- 
tween a  desire  and  a  volition,  which,  although  quite  fa- 
miliar to  those  who  are  accustomed  to  investigations  of 
this  sort,  may  not  be  entirely  clear  to  every  reader.  Desire 
is  a  state  of  the  mind — volition  an  act.  Nor  is  volition 
identical  with  determination.  Every  one  knows  what  it  is 
to  feel  that  a  certain  object  would  contribute  to  his  hap- 
piness. This  state  of  mind  we  call  desire.  He  may  then 
resolve  to  attempt  to  obtain  it  at  a  certain  time  or  upon 
a  certain  condition.  This  act  we  call  a  determination, 
which  may  remain  as  a  permanent  state  of  the  mind.  The 
combination  of  circumstances  under  which  the  effort,  ac- 
cording to  his  determination,  was  to  be  made,  may  never 
occur,  or  his  determination  may  have  changed  when  it 
does  occur.  In  either  case  the  effort  will  not  be  made. 
Thus  both  desire  and  determination  may  exist  without 
producing  an  effort.  But  when  an  effort  is  made,  we  are 
conscious  of  a  mental  act  immediately  preceding  and 
causing  that  effort.  There  is  an  internal  behest  in  obedi- 
ence to  which  the  body  moves  or  attempts  to  move.  This 
behest  is  what  is  termed  volition.     Avarice  may  produce 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  63 

the  desire  to  steal,  and  the  determination  to  steal.  But  it 
is  impossible  for  one  to  attempt  to  steal,  when  there  is 
nothing  to  be  stolen, — when  he  does  not  think  he  can  do 
so.  One  cannot  attempt  to  steal  an  apple,  when  he  be- 
lieves there  is  none  within  his  reach,  as  he  cannot  attempt 
to  drink  water  when  there  is  none  within  view  of  him. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  cause  of  a  volition  is  com- 
pound, consisting  of  the  internal  disposition  of  the  mind 
and  the  outward  circumstances.  I  have  attempted  to 
show,  in  the  Essay  on  Providence,  that  God  governs  all 
things.  This,  of  course,  would  include  the  outward  cir- 
cumstances,  which  would  put  one  element  of  control  over 
men's  volitions  into  His  hands.  It  is  necessary,  however, 
to  show  more  particularly  that  He  governs  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  mind. 

We  have  traced  the  action  to  its  cause,  the  volition, — 
the  volition  to  its  cause,  the  correlation  between  the  out- 
ward circumstances  and  the  inward  disposition  of  the  mind. 
Let  us  now  ask,  what  is  the  cause  of  that  disposition? 
Why  is  it  such  as  it  is  and  not  otherwise?  If  it  be  an- 
swered, the  mind  is  an  eternal  existence,  and  was  always 
such  as  it  now  is,  this  would  leave  one  clement  of  the 
controlling  cause  of  volition  in  God's  hand,  and  place  the 
other  beyond  His  control  ;  and  by  so  much  would  we  fail 
to  establish  His  efficient  government  over  the  actions 
of  men.  But  if  we  admit  that  the  mind  is  a  creature  of 
God,  which  I  shall  assume  as  admitted  by  all  those  for 
whom  this  is  written,  it  follows  that  He  either  made  it 
such  as  it  is  originally,  or  that  He  has  since  implanted 
those  dispositions,  or  that  He  has  allowed  it  to  be  modi- 
fied by  the  circumstances  around  it,  and  thus  to  become 
what  it  now  is.  Dispositions,  qualities,  tendencies  or  prop- 
erties, which  in  their  totality  make  up  what  we  call  the 
nature  of  a  thing,  are  not  abstract  and  eternal  existences, 
inhering  in  the  substances  to  which  they  belong,  as  soon 
as  they  are  created,  but  are  as  truly  the  creatures  of  God 


64  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

as  the  substances  to  which  they  belong.  Whether,  then, 
He  originally  endowed  the  mind  with  its  present  dispo- 
sitions, or  has  since  implanted  them,  or  has  allowed  it 
to  be  modified  by  outward  circumstances,  which  are  under 
His  control,  as  already  shown, — in  any  case,  the  mind  has 
not  become  what  it  is  in  defiance  of  the  will  of  God. 

If,  then,  He  controls  the  dispositions  of  the  mind  and 
the  outward  circumstances,  and  if  these,  united,  cause  and 
determine  the  volitions,  and  the  volitions  cause  and  de- 
termine the  actions,  this  is  nothing  else  than  His  efficient 
government  extended  over  the  actions  of  men. 

Is  this  reconcilable  with  the  first  definition  of  moral 
liberty?  According  to  that  definition,  moral  liberty  lies 
between  the  volition  and  the  action,  and  consists  of  the 
causal  relation  between  them.  Whatever  may  precede 
the  volition  or  follow  the  action,  does  not  infringe  upon 
that  liberty  which  lies  between  them.  The  efficient  gov- 
ernment of  God  over  men's  actions,  as  explained,  not 
only  allows,  but  necessarily  requires,  that  the  causal  con- 
nection in  which  moral  liberty  consists,  shall  be  preserved 
intact ;  for  if  God  governs  the  dispositions  of  men  and 
the  outward  circumstances,  and  thus  governs  their  voli- 
tions, but  those  volitions  do  not  govern  their  actions, 
His  government  does  not  extend  to  their  actions,  or  if  so, 
it  must  be  in  some  other  way  than  the  scheme  above  pro- 
posed. But  according  to  that  scheme,  God's  government 
over  men's  actions  is  complete,  and  their  liberty  not  only 
may  but  must  remain  intact.  That  connection,  in  which 
our  moral  liberty  consists,  the  causal  relation  between  our 
volitions  and  our  actions,  is  the  last  link  in  the  chain  by 
which,  according  to  the  plan  above  described,  God  gov- 
erns men's  actions ;  and  if  that  liberty  be  destroyed,  that 
link  severed,  His  government  fails  to  reach  so  far  as  our 
actions.  I  do  not  say  that  He  might  not  still  govern 
those  actions  in  some  other  way.  I  only  say,  that  so  far 
is  our  moral  liberty  from   being   inconsistent  with  God's 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY.  65 

efficient  government  over  our  actions,  according  to  the 
above  scheme,  which  I  think  to  be  the  true  one, — so  far  is 
it  from  being  irreconcilable  with  the  efficiency  of  the  di- 
vine government  over  us,  that  it  is  indispensably  neces- 
sary to  that  efficiency. 

The  second  definition   of  Moral   Liberty   I    take  from 
Haven's  Mental  Philosophy. 

"Freedom,  what. — In  approaching  this  much  disputed 
question,  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain,  in  the  first  place, 
what  is  meant  by  freedom,  and  [then]  what  by  freedom  of 
the  will,  else  we  may  discuss  the  matter  to  no  purpose. 
Various  definitions  of  freedom  have  been  given/  It  is  a 
word  in  very  common  use,  and,  in  its  general  application, 
not  liable  to  be  misunderstood.  Every  one  who  under- 
stands the  ordinary  language  of  life,  knows  well  enough 
what  freedom  is.  It  denotes  the  opposite  of  restraint; 
power  to  do  what  one  likes,  pleases,  is  inclined  to  do.  My 
person  is  free,  when  it  can  come  and  go,  do  this  or  that, 
as  suits  my  inclination.  Any  faculty  of  the  mind,  or 
organ  of  the  body,  is  free  when  its  own  specific  and  proper 
action  is  not  hindered.  Freedom  of  motion  is  power  to  move 
when  and  where  we  please.  Freedom  of  speech,  is  power 
to  say  what  we  like.  Freedom  of  action,  is  power  to  do 
what  we  like. 

"  Freedom  of  the  Will,  what. — What,  then,  is  freedom 
of  the  wit 'I  f  What  can  it  be  but  the  power  of  exercis- 
ing, without  restraint  or  hindrance,  its  own  specific  and 
proper  function,  viz.,  the  putting  forth  of  volitions,  just  such 
volitions  as  we  please.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the 
office  of  the  will,  its  specific  and  appropriate  action.  If 
nothing  prevents  or  restrains  me  from  forming  and  put- 
ting forth  such  volitions  as  I  please,  then  my  will  is  free  ; 
and  not  otherwise. 

"  Freedom  of  the  will,  then,  is  not  power  to  do  what  one 
wills  in  the  sense  of  executing  volitions  when  formed  ; 
that  is  simple  freedom  of  the  limbs  and    muscular  appa- 


66  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

ratus,  not  of  will — a  freedom  which  may  be  destroyed  by 
a  stroke  of  paralysis,  or  an  iron  chain ;  it  is  not  a  freedom 
of  walking,  if  one  wills  to  walk,  or  of  singing,  or  flying, 
or  moving  the  right  arm,  if  one  is  so  disposed.  That  is 
freedom,  but  not  freedom  of  the  will.  My  will  is  free, 
not  when  I  can  do  what  I  will,  but  when  /  can  will  to  do 
just  what  I  please.  Whatever  freedom  the  will  has,  must 
lie  within  its  own  proper  sphere  of  action,  and  not  with- 
out it ;  must  relate  to  that,  and  not  to  something  else." — 

Pp-  538,539- 

Tappan,  in  his  Review  of  Edwards,  says,  liberty  is  syn- 
onymous with  contingency,  and  contingency  is  the  oppo- 
site of  necessity.  He  then  defines  "necessity  as  that 
which  is,  and  which  cannot  possibly  not  be,  or  be  other- 
wise than  it  is.  Contingency,  then,  as  the  opposite  idea, 
must  be,  that  tvliicJi  is,  or  may  be,  and  which  possibly  might 
not  be,  or  might  be  otherwise  than  it  is."  And  again,  p. 
197:  "Must  its  (the  will's)  nisus,  its  self-determining  en- 
ergy, or  its  volition,  follow  a  uniform  and  inevitable  law?" 
"  Will,  in  relation  to  volition,  is  just  what  any  cause  is  in 
relation  to  its  effect.  Will  causing  volitions,  causes  them 
just  as  any  other  cause  causes  its  effects."  Again,  p.  187, 
"  Self-determining  will  means  simply  a  will  causing  its 
own  volitions  ;  and  consequently  particularly  determining 
and  directing  them." 

Whether  Tappan  is  intentionally  vague,  or  has  not 
sufficient  command  of  language  to  give  an  accurate  ex- 
pression of  his  idea,  or  his  idea  itself  be  vague  and  con- 
fused, I  shall  not  attempt  to  decide.  But  I  sincerely  re- 
gret that  he  has  not  given  a  more  accurate  definition  of 
liberty,  as  he  understood  it.  I  think,  however,  that  his 
opinion  corresponds  with  Haven's  :  "  The  power  of  exer- 
cising, without  restraint  or  hindrance,  its  own  specific  and 
proper  function,  viz.,  the  putting  forth  of  volitions,  just 
such  volitions  as  we  please." 

According    to    this    definition,    whatever  destroys    the 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  67 

power  of  the  will  to  put  forth  volitions  and  to  determine 
their  character,  destroys  its  freedom ;  and  whatever  pre- 
vents it,  on  a  given  occasion,  from  putting  forth  or  de- 
termining a  volition,  interferes,  thus  far,  with  its  freedom  ; 
and  conversely,  whatever  does  not  destroy  that  power, 
nor  prevent  its  exercise  in  any  case,  does  not  infringe  upon 
its  freedom. 

Can  it  be  shown  that  the  government  of  God  may  be 
extended  over  our  actions  without  at  all  infringing  upon 
our  moral  liberty,  as  thus  defined  ? 

We  see  an  action  performed,  and  inquire  what  caused 
it?  The  answer  is,  a  volition.  We  next  inquire  what 
caused  the  volition  ?  The  answer  is,  the  will  caused  it  by 
"  the  power  of  exercising,  without  restraint  or  hindrance 
its  own  specific  and  proper  function,  viz.,  the  putting  forth 
of  volitions,  just  such  volitions  as  the  person  pleased." 
This,  then,  establishes  his  free-agency,  according  to  the 
second  definition.  But  it  does  not  exhaust  the  legitimate 
questions  that  may  be  asked.  We  may  ask,  why  did  the 
mind  put  forth  such  a  volition,  and  not  a  different  one  ?  The 
answer  to  this  must  be,  since  the  nature  of  the  cause  de- 
termines the  nature  of  the  effect,  the  volition  was  such 
as  it  was  and  not  otherwise,  because  the  will,  or  rather  the 
mind,  was  such  as  it  was  and  not  otherwise.  Nor  is  the 
series  of  legitimate  questions  yet  exhausted.  How,  came 
the  mind,  or  the  will,  to  be  constituted  thus  and  not 
otherwise  ?  To  this,  as  was  remarked  under  the  first 
definition,  two  answers  are  theoretically  possible  : 

First:  it  is  an  eternal  existence,  and  eternally  possessed 
that  spontaneous  activity  from  which  its  volitions  spring, 
and  those  dispositions  or  inclinations  which  determined 
the  character  or  quality  of  the  volition.  Upon  this  sup- 
position, I  would  observe,  every  mind  would  be  an  abso- 
lutely independent  centre  and  source  of  action,  which  no 
power  in  the  universe  could  control,  that  is,  in  so  far  as 
ts   volitions  are  concerned,    without  destroying   its  free- 


68  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

agency  to  the  whole  extent  of  that  control.  The  outward 
actions  of  men  might  yet  be  under  the  negative  control 
of  God;  that  is,  He  might  prevent  any  given  volition  from 
being  consummated  in  the  external  act.  But  He  could 
exercise  no  positive,  efficient  control  over  those  actions, 
unless  he  compelled  men  to  act,  or  rather  to  move,  inde- 
pendently of  their  volitions. 

Second  answer:  The  mind,  together  with  that  faculty 
or  power  which  we  call  the  will,  being  a  creature  of  God, 
either  received  its  dispositions  from  Him  at  the  time  of 
its  creation,  or  He  has  since  implanted  them  within  it,  or 
else  He  has  permitted  it  to  acquire  them  from  some  other 
source.  So  that  it  has  not  one  single  disposition  in  spite 
of  its  Creator. 

According  to  this  supposition,  God  governs  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  mind  : — these  govern  the  will : — the  will  puts 
forth  volitions : — the  volitions  govern  the  actions.  Thus, 
God  exercises  an  efficient  control  over  the  actions  of  men, 
which  control  is  not  only  reconcilable  with  their  free- 
agency,  but  absolutely  requires  that  that  free-agency  be 
preserved  intact  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  its  own  ex- 
istence. 

We  can  proceed  no  further.  These  are  the  only  defi- 
nitions that  I  have  found,  and  I  believe,  the  only  rational 
conceptions  that  are  possible.  I  might,  in  the  first  place, 
have  attempted  to  show  what  was  the  true  definition  of 
Free-Agency,  and  what  the  false,  and  then  have  attempted 
to  show  the  consistency  between  the  true  one  and  the 
divine  government ;  but  it  would  be  folly  to  suppose  that 
I  should  be  able  to  convince  the  followers  of  Edwards 
that  his  definition  was  false,  and  the  other  true,  or  that  I 
could  satisfy  those  who  hold  with  Tappan  and  Haven, 
that  Edwards'  definition  was  the  true  one  and  the  other 
false.  So  that,  whether  I  had  adopted  this  or  that  defini- 
tion, those  who  hold  the  other  as  true,  might  have  said, 
you  have  indeed  shown  the  consistency  between  the  di- 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  69 

vine  government  and  our  free-agency  according  to  that 
definition  ;  but  since  we  hold  free-agency  to  be  something 
quite  different  from  that  concerning  which  you  have  been 
reasoning,  the  whole  difficulty  remains  not  only  unsolved,, 
but  untouched. 

I,  therefore,  thought  it  best  to  adopt  the  exhaustive 
method,  to  attempt  to  reconcile  each  possible  definition 
with  the  divine  government  over  us;  thus  presenting  to 
every  one  a  reasoning  which  would  apply  to  his  own 
opinion  as  to  the  nature  of  Free-Agency. 

I  subjoin  an  extract  from  Dugald  Stewart,  and  one  from 
Sir  W.  Hamilton,  bearing  on  the  question,  whether  the 
will  is  the  simple  cause  of  volitions,  or  whether  that  cause 
is  compound,  being  a  correlation  between  internal  dispo- 
sitions and  outward  motives  or  inducements.  "  Every 
action  is  performed,"  says  Stewart,  "  with  some  view,  or, 
in  other  words,  is  performed  from  some  motive.  Dr.  Reid, 
indeed,  denies  this  with  zeal,  but  I  am  doubtful  if  he  has 
strengthened  his  cause  by  doing  so  ;  for  he  confesses  that 
the  actions  which  are  performed  without  motives  are  per- 
fectly trifling  and  insignificant,  and  not  such  as  lead  to 
any  general  conclusion  concerning  the  merit  or  demerit 
of  moral  agents.  I  should,  therefore,  rather  be  disposed 
to  yield  this  point  than  to  dispute  a  proposition  not  ma- 
terially connected  with  the  question  at  issue.  One  thing 
is  clear  and  indisputable,  that  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  a  man 
acts  from  motives  and  intentions,  that  he  is  entitled  to 
the  character  of  a  rational  being."  Active  and  Moral 
Potvers;  p.  274,  Am.  Ed.  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  speaking 
of  causation  in  general,  says :  "  It  would  be  here  out  of 
place  to  refute  the  error  of  philosophers  in  supposing  that 
anything  can  have  a  single  cause  ; — meaning  always  by  a 
cause  that  without  which  the  effect  would  not  have  been. 
I  speak,  of  course,  only  of  second  causes,  for  of  the 
divine  causation  we  can  form  no  conception."  Disc,  p. 
584.     These   testimonies   are   the  more  important,   since 


yo  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

both  these  great  philosophers  were  decided  anti-necessita- 
rians. 

I  shall  now  offer  some  strictures  upon  the  opinions  of 
Tappan  and  those  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 

First  of  Tappan.  The  great  object  of  his  Review  of 
Edwards  is  to  prove  that  the  Will  is  the  free,  that  is,  the 
contingent  cause  of  its  volition.  How  well  he  has  suc- 
ceeded will  appear  in  what  follows. 

He  has  nowhere  given  a  direct  definition  of  either 
Liberty  or  Contingency.  Liberty,  he  says,  is  synony- 
mous with  Contingency,  and  Contingency  is  the  opposite 
of  Necessity.  He  then  proceeds :  "  Necessity  is  that 
which  is  and  cannot  possibly  not  be,  or  be  otherwise  than 
it  is.  Contingency,  then,  as  the  opposite  idea,  must  be 
that  which  is,  or  may  be,  and  which  possibly  might  not  be, 
or  might  be  otherwise  than  it  is.  Now,  contingency  can- 
not have  place  with  respect  to  anything  which  is  inde- 
pendent of  will ; — time  and  space, — mathematical  and 
metaphysical  truths  :  for  example,  that  all  right  angles  are 
equal,  that  every  phenomenon  supposes  a  cause,  cannot 
be  contingent,  for  they  are  seen  to  be  real  and  true  in 
themselves.  They  do  not  arise  from  will,  nor  is  it  con- 
ceivable that  will  can  alter  them,  for  it  is  not  conceivable 
that  they  admit  of  change  from  any  source.  If  the  idea 
of  contingency  have  place  as  a  rational  idea,  it  must  be 
with  respect  to  causes,  being,  and  phenomena,  which  de- 
pend upon  will.  *  *  * 

"  Now  every  one  will  grant  that  the  creation  does  not 
seem  necessary  as  time  and  space;  and  intuitive  truths 
with  their  logical  deductions  seem  necessary."  (His 
punctuation.) 

I  am  confident  of  showing  that  he  has  entirely  missed 
the  question  at  issue.  His  great  object  is  to  prove  that 
the  will  is  a  contingent,  as  opposed  to  a  necessary,  cause. 
In  order  to  do  this,  he  has  pointed  out  what  everybody 
knows,  that  there  are  certain  general  trnths  or  principles 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  J I 

which  are  eternally  and  universally  true,  and  are  not  effects 
flowing  from  any  cause  or  causes ;  and  that  there  are 
certain  facts  or  events  which  spring  from  particular 
causes,  and  are  therefore  dependent  on  those  causes  for 
their  existence.  None  of  the  first  class  can  be  changed 
or  annihilated,  either  in  reality  or  in  conception.  Any  one 
of  the  latter  may  be  changed  or  annihilated  in  concep- 
tion.    This  is  the  sum  total  of  what  he  has  proved. 

Upon  this  I  remark :  he  proves  precisely  the  same  kind 
of  contingency  concerning  every  cause  and  its  effect,  as 
concerning  will  and  volition.  We  can  modify  or  annihi- 
late a  given  volition  in  thought;  that  is,  we  can  conceive 
it  as  being  different  in  this  or  that  respect  from  what  it 
really  is,  or  we  can  suppose  it  not  to  be  at  all.  And  so 
we  can  of  any  other  event  or  effect  whatever.  "  Every 
one  will  grant  that  the  creation  does  not  seem  necessary, 
as  time  and  space,  and  intuitive  truths  with  their  logical 
deductions,  seem  necessary."  Yes,  we  can  dispense  with 
the  creation  in  thought,  that  is,  suppose  it  never  to  have 
taken  place,  and  so  we  can  with  any  creature  or  event,  as, 
for  example,  the  Flood.  And  "  every  one  will  grant  "  that 
any  particular  volition,  as  for  instance  that  of  Judas  to 
betray  the  Saviour,  "does  not  appear  necessary  as  time 
and  space,"  etc.,  that  is,  any  volition  may  be  dispensed 
with  in  conception, — supposed  not  to  have  occurred.  All 
events  or  effects  are  contingent,  in  the  sense  that  we  can 
alter  or  annihilate  them  in  conception.  Thus  far  there  is 
certainly  no  distinction  between  the  connection  of  voli- 
tions as  effects  with  wills  as  their  causes,  and  the  connec- 
tion of  any  other  effect  with  its  cause. 

Is  this  the  contingency  that  Tappan  predicates  and 
wishes  to  prove,  as  belonging  to  the  will  and  its  volitions 
as  effects  ?     I  suppose  not ;  for  he  says  : 

"  The  inherent  nature  of  cause  may  be  so  constituted 
and  fixed,  that  the  nisus  by  which  it  determines  itself  to 
produce  phenomena,  shall  take  place  according  to  invaria- 


J2  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

ble  and  necessary  laws.  This  we  believe  to  be  true  with 
respect  to  all  physical  causes.  Heat,  electricity,  galvan- 
ism, magnetism,  gravitation,  mechanical  forces  in  general, 
and  the  powers  at  work  in  chemical  affinities,  produce 
their  phenomena  according  to  fixed,  and,  with  respect  to 
the  powers  themselves,  necessary  laws.  We  do  not  con- 
ceive it  possible  for  these  powers  to  produce  any  other 
phenomena,  under  given  circumstances,  than  those  which 
they  actually  produce.  When  a  burning  coal  is  thrown 
into  a  mass  of  dry  gunpowder,  an  explosion  must  take 
place. 

"  Now,  is  it  true  likewise  that  the  cause  which  we  call 
will,  must,  under  given  circumstances,  necessarily  produce 
such  and  such  phenomena?  Must  its  visits,  its  self-deter- 
mining energy,  or  its  volition,  follow  a  uniform  and  inev- 
itable law?" — Pp.  196,  197. 

The  expression  :  "  We  do  not  conceive  it  possible  for 
these  powers  to  produce  any  other  phenomena,  under 
given  circumstances,  than  those  which  they  actually  pro- 
duce," is  equivocal.  In  one  sense  it  is  true, — in  the  other 
erroneous.  If  it  means,  we  do  not  conceive  it  possible  for 
any  event  to  happen  without  an  adequate  cause,  nor,  con- 
versely, that  it  is  possible  for  a  cause  to  fail  to  produce  the 
effect  to  whose  production  it  is  adequate,  and  that,  sup- 
posing these  causes  to  retain  their  present  natures,  we  do 
not  conceive  it  possible  for  them  to  produce  events  to 
whose  production  they  are  inadequate,- — if  this  be  the 
meaning,  it  is  correct. 

If,  however,  the  meaning  be  that  we  cannot  conceive 
the  idea  of  a  coal  of  fire  lying  in  a  mass  of  dry  gunpowder 
without  producing  an  explosion,  or  of  a  magnet  and  a 
piece  of  iron  repelling  instead  of  attracting  each  other, 
then  it  is  erroneous :  for  there  is  no  difficulty  in  forming 
such  a  conception.  And,  in  general,  I  do  not  see  that  we 
are  necessitated  to  think  this  or  that  particular  cause  as 
adequate  to  the  production  of  this  or  that  particular  effect  1 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY.  73 

though  we  are  necessitated  to  think  every  phenomenon  as 
having  some  adequate  cause,  and  every  cause  as  actually 
producing  the  effect  to  whose  production  it  is  ade- 
quate ;  and  when  we  conceive  a  given  cause  as  adequate 
to  the  production  of  a  given  effect,  we  cannot  form  the 
contradictory  conception  of  the  two  as  thus  reciprocally 
or  correlatively  connected  and  dependent,  and  yet  sep- 
arate. 

We  may  thus  clearly  distinguish  two  kinds  of  necessity. 
The  one  binds  things  together  in  their  external  reality 
only.  One  cannot  place  a  burning  coal  in  a  mass  of  dry 
gunpowder  and  yet  prevent  an  explosion.  Necessity  binds 
these  two  together  in  their  external  existence.  But  he 
may  without  difficulty  form  the  conception  of  a  coal  cast 
and  remaining  in  such  a  mass  without  an  explosion.  This 
necessity  extends  only  to  actual  existences.  Again,  one 
cannot  construct  a  triangle,  two  of  whose  sides,  taken  to- 
gether, are  not  greater  than  the  third  side,  nor  can  he 
form  the  conception  of  such  a  triangle.  If  he  makes  it,  he 
necessarily  makes  the  two  sides  greater  than  the  third,  and 
if  he  conceives  it  necessarily  conceives  them  greater. 
This  necessity  extends  both  to  external  existence  and  to 
our  conception  of  it. 

Is  this,  then,  the  contingency  with  which  Tappan  would 
endow  the  will  or  prove  it  to  be  endowed?  Has  he  writ- 
ten a  book  to  prove  that  we  can  conceive  the  will  as  choos- 
ing differently  from  what  it  actually  chooses  ?  If  so,  he  has 
proved  no  contingency  as  belonging  to  it  which  does  not 
belong  equally  to  every  other  cause.  And  with  respect  to 
the  others, he  has  unequivocally  admitted  that  there  is  a  real 
necessity.  Having  admitted  that  all  physical  causes  are 
necessary  "  with  respect  to  the  powers  themselves," 
although  not  necessary  in  general  thought  as  principles  are, 
and  having  failed  to  prove  that  the  will  is  contingent  in  any 
sense  which  is  not  equally  applicable  to  those  causes 
which  he  admits  to  be  really  necessary,  and  having  failed 


74  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

even  to  point  out  any  other  kind  of  contingency,  he  has 
utterly  failed  to  prove  that  the  will  is  free  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  contingent, — contingent  as  opposed  to  necessary.  To 
have  shown  that  we  can  suppose  a  given  will  to  put  forth 
volitions  different  from  those  which  it  actually  puts  forth, 
while  it,  in  its  real  existence,  is  left  in  the  same  category 
with  those  causes  which  are,  "  with  respect  to  the  powers 
themselves,  necessary,"  is  certainly  a  small  measure  of 
success. 

But  he  has  not  only  failed  to  prove,  or  even  to  point 
out,  any  sort  of  contingency  as  belonging  to  the  will  which 
does  not  belong  equally  to  "  all  physical  causes"  which  he 
admits  to  be  "  necessary  with  respect  to  themselves," — he 
has  not  only  failed  to  prove  or  even  to  specify  any  such 
distinction,  but  has  unequivocally  denied  the  existence  of 
any  such.     He  says  : 

"  Will,  in  relation  to  volition,  is  just  what  any  cause  is 
in  relation  to  its  effect.  Will  causing  volitions,  causes 
them  just  as  any  other  cause  causes  its  effects."  Here  he 
not  only  does  not  disprove  nor  even  deny,  but  plainly  as- 
serts that  the  connection  between  will  and  volition  is  pre- 
cisely the  same  as  between  any  other  cause  and  its  effect ; 
and  he  has  not  only  failed  to  disprove,  or  even  to  deny, 
but  has  unequivocally  asserted  that  the  connection  is 
necessary  between  all  physical  causes  and  their  effects. 
If,  then,  "  Liberty  is  synonymous  with  Contingency,  and 
Contingency  is  opposed  to  Necessity,  and  Necessity" 
binds  all  causes  to  their  effects,  Will  to  Volition  as  well 
as  any  other,  then  Tappan  has  utterly  failed,  even  by  his 
own  showing,  to  establish  the  Freedom  of  the  Will. 

If  he  intended  to  show  a  distinction  between  Contin- 
gency and  Necessity  which  would  avail  him,  he  should 
have  confined  himself  to  the  realm  of  events,  and  have 
shown  that,  notwithstanding  all  may  be  changed  or 
annihilated  in  thouglit,  some  of  them  cannot  but  follow 
their    causes    in    reality,    while   others   may   or   may   not 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND  PHILOSOPHY.  75 

follow  theirs.  But  suppose  this  sort  of  contingency  estab- 
lished, that  some  causes  may  or  may  not  produce  certain 
effects,  or  the  same  causes  may  produce  different  effects, 
still  the  question  is  legitimate:  why  did  a  certain 
cause  produce  one  effect  yesterday  and  another  to-day, 
and  at  another  time  none  at  all?  If  it  be  assumed  that 
the  nature  of  the  cause  determines  that  of  the  effect,  and 
that  this  is  a  sufficient  reason  why  a  given  one  of  the 
effects  is  such  as  it  is  and  not  otherwise,  this  is  a  sufficient 
answer  as  to  that  one.  But  when  we  inquire  why  another 
is  such  as  it  is  and  not  like  the  former,  so  far  is  it  from 
being  a  sufficient  answer,  that  it  is  a  reason  why  it  should 
not  be  as  it  is,  but  should  have  been  otherwise,  that  is, 
like  the  former.  It  is  a  lucus  a  rion  lucendo.  If  it  be  said 
that  the  circumstances  were  different,  and  this  is  the 
reason  why  the  same  cause  produced  different  effects,  this 
is  simply  to  admit  that  every  cause  is  compound,  and  that 
the  effect  varies  and  must  vary  as  either  part  of  the  com- 
pound varies.  But  this,  instead  of  showing  contingency 
in  the  cause  in  the  sense  that  the  same  cause  may  produce 
different  effects,  shows  a  fixed  and  invariably  certain  con- 
nection between  cause  and  effect,  and  that  the  nature  of 
the  cause  absolutely  determines  that  of  the  effect,  at  least 
so  far  as  the  case  under  examination  goes.  If  it  be  said 
that  no  reason  whatever  can  be  given  for  the  variation, 
then  this  is  contingency  in  the  sense  which  he  utterly  re- 
pudiates, viz.,  chance,  accident,  no-cause.  If  a  ball  is 
moving  in  a  given  direction,  and  then  changes  its  direc- 
tion, to  say  that  it  changes  without  any  cause,  is  no  more 
reasonable  than  to  say  that  it  started  without  a  cause. 
Variation  is  an  effect  which  demands  a  cause  as  much  as 
any  other. 

What,  then,  is  Contingency  ?  Is  it  merely  a  word  rep- 
resenting nothing?  Perhaps  there  may  be  no  serious  ob- 
jections against  its  employment,  as  it  frequently  is  em- 
ployed, to  discriminate  between  what  I  have  termed  facts, 


j6  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

which  means,  etymologically,  things  done,  and  what  I  have 
called  general  truths  or  general  principles.  We  may  dis- 
criminate these  by  calling  the  first  contingent  truths  and 
the  latter  necessary  truths.  But  I  would  prefer  to  define 
it  thus : 

Contingency  is  the  expression  of  the  necessary  connec- 
tion of  two  or  more  events.  "  The  sumption  or  general 
rule  in  such  a  syllogism  is  necessarily  a  hypothetical  pro- 
position. (//A  is,  tJicn  B  is.)  In  such  a  proposition  it  is 
merely  enounced  that  the  prior  member  (A)  and  the  pos- 
terior member  (B)  stand  to  each  other  in  the  relation  of 
reason  and  consequent,  if  existing,  but  without  it  being 
determined  whether  they  really  exist  or  not."  Hamilton's 
Logic,  Par.  LXV. 

It  has  already  been  shown,  in  Essays  First  and  Second, 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  uncertainty  in  outward 
things  or  events  themselves,  and  that  they  are  all  bound  to- 
gether, past,  present  and  future,  by  the  great  law  of  caus- 
ality into  a  systematic  whole :  that  whatever  uncer- 
tainty there  may  be  concerning  any  event  or  events,  is  in 
the  mind,  not  in  the  things  themselves.  I  now  say  of 
contingency,  that  it  may  exist  in  the  mind,  but  that  it 
does  not  necessarily  exist  anywhere  except  in  the  form  of 
expression.  For  example,  I  may  say  if  the  temperature 
of  a  given  vessel  of  water  fell  to  thirty-two  degrees  above 
zero  at  a  certain  time,  the  water  froze.  Unless  it  fell  thus 
low,  the  water  did  not  freeze.  And  I  may  use  these  ex- 
pressions, either  having  absolute  knowledge  of  the  real  ex- 
istence or  non-existence  of  the  facts,  or  being  entirely 
ignorant  as  to  whether  they  did  or  did  not  happen.  The 
only  thing  asserted  is,  an  inseparable  connection  between 
a  given  fall  of  temperature  and  the  freezing  of  the  water. 
This  is  a  contingent  expression.  And'  it  may  be  used  in 
reference  to  the  present  and  future  as  well  as  to  the  past. 
In  order  to  distinguish  it  accurately  from  certainty,  let  us 
throw    it   into  the   future.     If  the    temperature    of  this 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  7J 

water  be  reduced  to  thirty-two  degrees,  it  will  freeze. 
Unless  its  temperature  be  thus  reduced,  it  will  not  freeze. 
Here  the  connection  of  these  events  with  any  real  exis- 
tence is  neither  affirmed  nor  denied. 

This  water  will  be  frozen  to-morrow  morning  !     This  is 
an  expression  of  certainty,  and  if  I  can  show  the  precise 
difference  between  it  and  the  foi  mer.  I   shall  have  shown 
the  exact  difference  between  contingency  and  certainty,  as 
I  use  the  words.     We   have  seen  what   was  contained  in 
the  contingent  expression,  viz.,  the  affirmation  of  a  neces- 
sary connection  between  two  events ;  and  what  was  not 
contained,   viz.,   neither  the  affirmation  nor  negation  of 
real  existence,  nor  of  their  connection  with  any  actual  event 
In  this  last  case  there  is  neither  affirmation  nor  negation 
of    any   connection  whatever  expressed ;    but  there  is  an 
implied  affirmation  of  the  inseparable  connection  of  the 
given  event  with  causes  now  actually  existent, — such  and 
so  many  as  are  necessary  to  its  production  ;  and  there  is  a 
mental  implied  negation  of  the  existence  of  anything  that 
can  efficiently  counteract  those  causes,  and  thus  prevent 
the  occurrence  of  the  event.     I  say  all  this  is  implied,  be- 
cause the  assertion   that   an   event   will  occur,   does   not 
mean  that  it  will  spring  into  existence  without  a  cause, 
nor  that  that  which  immediately  precedes  and  causes  it, 
will  happen  without  a  cause.     Nor  is  it  possible  to  avoid 
the  absurdity  of  supposing  an  uncaused  event — something 
springing  out  of  nothing — "  an  absolute  commencement," 
unless  we  mentally  and  impliedly  connect  it  with  things 
now  existing.     The  unqualified  affirmation  that  an  event 
will  occur,  implies  either  that  it  is  provided  for  in  the  sys- 
tem of  the  universe,  or  that  it  is  to  be  accomplished  by 
the  direct  exertion  of  divine  power,  or  else  that  it  will  be 
one  of  a  series  of  events,  causes  and  effects,  hereafter  to 
be   originated  by  divine  power.     Any  one  of  these  will 
avoid  the  absurd  supposition  of  an  absolute  commence- 
ment, and  none  other  will.     So  that  any  mental  concep- 


78  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  upon  which  we  may  found  the  certain  expression  of 
a  future  event,  implies,  or  perhaps  I  should  rather  say, 
includes,  the  idea  of  its  potential  existence  in  the  present, 
that  is,  its  necessary  connection  with  things  actually  exist- 
ing. 

The  difference,  then,  between  a  contingent  and  a  cer- 
tain expression  is  this :  the  first  affirms  a  necessary  and 
inseparable  connection  between  two  or  more  hypothetical 
events,  without  either  asserting  or  denying  their  connec- 
tion with  anything  really  existing  ;  the  second  does  not 
necessarily  express  anything  more  than  the  affirmation  that 
a  given  event  will  occur,  or  has  occurred,  or  is  now  occur- 
ring, (for  the  above  reasoning  will  apply  to  the  past  or 
present  as  well  as  to  the  future) ;  but  it  implies  or  includes 
the  mental  affirmation  of  its  necessary  connection  with 
present  existences.     See  Contingency,  in  Essay  First. 

I  will  here  offer  a  few  remarks  upon  the  supposed  op- 
position between  Necessity  and  Liberty.  I  have  some- 
where seen  the  following  aigument  against  Necessity 
(I  believe  it  is  Sir  YY.  Hamilton's) :  "  If,"  says  the  writer, 
"  there  be  a  necessary  connection  between  wills  and  voli- 
tions, as  between  all  other  causes  and  their  effects,  then 
there  is  no  reason  why  this  Necessity  should  not  extend  to 
God  as  well  as  to  men.  But  to  suppose  God  subject  to 
Necessity  is  to  make  him  subordinate  or  secondary  to 
something  else  ;  and  then  that  something  else  to  which 
we  make  Him  subordinate,  is  the  real  God  :  for  absolute 
supremacy  is  manifestly  one  of  the  attributes  of  God." 
As  I  quote  from  memory,  the  words  may  not  be  exactly 
correct,  but  1  think  the  substance  is.  See  Hamilton's 
Disc,  pp.  41  and  42. 

There  is  a  mistake  here  in  regard  to  what  is  meant  by 
Necessity.  When  it  is  said  that  God  cannot  lie — equiva- 
lent to  saying  He  necessarily  speaks  the  truth  when 
He  speaks  at  all — it  is  not  meant  that  there  is  some  other 
being    more    powerful   than    He,    and    having    absolute 


ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY.  Jg 

control  over  His  faculties,  who  interposes  whenever  God 
attempts  to  speak  falsehood,  and  prevents  it,  or  is  ready 
to  interpose  if  He  should  so  attempt, — this  is  not  what  is 
meant  ;  but  simply  that  His  own  nature  is  so  pure  that 
falsehood  cannot  possibly  spring  from  it.  There  is,  in 
His  nature,  no  cause  adequate  to  the  production  of  false- 
hood, as  there  is  no  cause  in  fire  adequate  to  the  produc- 
tion of  cold  ;  nor  is  there  anything  in  that  nature  upon 
which  any  outward  temptation  could  take  hold,  as  gold 
takes  hold  of  avarice  in  an  avaricious  and  dishonest  man, 
to  produce  the  effect  of  falsehood  by  the  conjunction  of 
the  outward  circumstances  with  the  inward  disposition. 
The  whole  explanation  lies  in  the  nature  of  causality — 
that  nothing  can  occur  without  an  adequate  cause,  and 
that  a  cause  cannot  but  produce  the  effect  to  whose  pro- 
duction it  is  adequate.  The  error  in  the  author's  reason- 
ing is,  that  it  supposes  Necessity  to  be  a  personal  exist- 
ence, exercising  an  arbitrary  control  over  other  beings, 
whereas  the  word,  in  this  case,  simply  expresses  the  self- 
evident  principle  that  the  nature  of  the  cause  determines 
and  controls  the  nature  of  the  effect.  If  any  one  asserts 
that  that  Necessity  which  consists  merely  in  a  being's 
acting  in  accordance  with  his  own  nature,  is  opposed  to 
Liberty,  I  know  not  what  his  notion  of  liberty  can  be. 

I  shall  now  offer  some  remarks  upon  the  opinions  of  Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  whose  name  I  mention  with  the  deepest 
reverence  due  to  human  greatness  and  goodness,  who, 
intellectually,  "  from  his  shoulders  and  upwards  was 
higher  than  any  of  the  people."  I  regard  him,  as  he  does 
Aristotle,  as  "  the  Prince  of  Philosophers."  They  seem 
to  me  to  contain  a  most  incongruous  mixture  of  the 
most  original,  acute  and  comprehensive  conception,  and 
the  crudest  and  most  incorrigible  prejudice,  thus  afford- 
ing a  singular  verification  of  the  saying  that  "  great  men 
are  not  always  wise." 

"  How  the  will  can  possibly  be  free,"   says  he,    "must 


So  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

remain  to  us,  under  the  present  limitation  of  our  faculties, 
wholly  incomprehensible.  We  are  unable  to  conceive  an 
absolute  commencement ;  we  cannot,  therefore,  conceive 
a  free  volition.  A  determination  by  motives  cannot,  to 
our  understanding,  escape  from  necessitation.  Nay,  were 
we  even  to  admit  as  true,  what  we  cannot  think  as  possi- 
ble, still  the  doctrine  of  a  motiveless  volition  would  be 
only  casualism  ;  and  the  free  acts  of  an  indifferent,  are, 
morally  and  rationally,  as  worthless  as  the  pre-ordered 
passions  of  a  determined,  will.  How,  therefore,  I  repeat, 
moral  liberty  is  possible  in  man  or  God,  we  are  utterly 
unable,  speculatively,  to  understand.  But  practically,  the 
fact,  that  we  are  free,  is  given  to  us  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  uncompromising  law  of  duty,  in  the  consciousness 
of  our  moral  accountability."  Discussions,  p.  587.  See 
also,  Hamilton's  Logic,  p.  413. 

"Errors,"  he  says,  quoting  from  Archbishop  Whately,"are 
the  more  carefully  to  be  pointed  out  in  proportion  to  the 
authority  by  which  they  are  sanctioned" — p.  131.  Upon 
this  principle  I  shall  proceed  in  the  discussion  of  the 
opinions  of  Sir  William,  in  which  opinions  it  would  be 
most  flagrant  injustice  to  deny  him  the  credit  of  complete 
originality.  He  clearly  perceives  the  utter  futility  of  all 
such  attempts  as  those  of  Stewart  and  Tappan  to  answer 
the  reasoning  of  the  necessitarians,  and  yet  he  is  resolved 
not  to  adopt  the  conclusions  of  the  necessitarians,  be- 
cause they  seem  to  him  to  collide  with  a  foregone  conclu- 
sion concerning  free-agency.  His  "  relentless  logic  "  has 
forsaken  him  for  once,  or  rather  he  has  forsaken  it,  and 
refuses  to  follow  it  to  the  conclusion  to  which  he  admits 
it  would  inevitably  lead  him.  And  consequently  he  ap- 
pears as  Samson  shorn  of  his  locks  and  spoiled  of  his 
eyes. 

What,  according  to  Sir  William,  is  a  free  volition?  It 
is  a  volition  which  did  not  spring  from  anything  existing 
before  it.     "  We  are  unable  to  conceive  an  absolute  com- 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  8 1 

mencement ;  we  cannot,  therefore,  conceive  a  free  volition." 
If  it  springs  from  anything  before  it,  whether  in  or  out  of 
the  mind,  then  it  is  not  an  "absolute  commencement,"  and 
therefore  not  a  "  free  volition."  And  he  states  still  more 
explicitly  that  he  does  not  think  it  can  be  free,  if  it  spring 
from  any  cause  either  without  or  within  the  mind.  "A 
determination  by  motives  cannot,  to  our  understanding, 

escape  from  necessitation The  doctrine  of  a 

motiveless  volition  would  be  only  casualism  ;  and  the  free 
acts  of  an  indifferent,  are,  morally  and  rationally,  as 
worthless  as  the  pre-ordered  passions  of  a  determined, 
will."  This  language  is  too  clear  to  admit  of  doubt  or 
misunderstanding.  If  it  is  determined  by  motives,  it 
cannot  escape  from  necessitation.  If  it  is  motiveless,  it 
is  only  casualism.  If  it  is  the  act  of  an  indifferent  will 
it  is  morally  and  rationally  worthless.  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
undoubtedly  teaches  that  a  free  volition  is  an  uncaused 
event ! 

He  does  not  attempt  to  establish  his  position  by  rea- 
soning. He  admits  that  this  cannot  be  done,  and  appeals 
directly  to  consciousness.  "  Hoiv,  therefore,  I  repeat, 
moral  liberty  is  possible  in  man  or  God,  we  are  utterly 
unable,  speculatively,  to  understand.  But,  practically,  the 
fact  that  we  are  free,  is  given  to  us  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  uncompromising  law  of  duty,  in  the  consciousness 
of  our  moral  accountability."  If  the  fact  that  we  are 
free,  in  the  sense  that  we  are  not  the  causes  of  our  voli- 
tions, is  given  us  in  the  consciousness  of  a  law  of  duty 
and  of  our  accountability,  it  must  be  either  identical  with 
the  one  or  the  other,  or  with  the  sum  of  the  two ;  or  else 
it  must  be  involved  in,  and  deducible  from,  one  or  both. 
Let  each  one  appeal  to  his  own  consciousness.  He  is 
conscious  of  being  under  a  law  of  duty,  and  of  his  moral 
accountability.  Is  he  conscious  that  the  assertion  that 
he  is  not  the  cause  of  his  volitions,  is  identical  with  either 
of  the  former  assertions,  or  with  their  sum  ?     "I  am  under 


82  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

a  law  of  duty."  "  I  am  not  the  cause  of  my  volitions." 
Are  these  only  different  modes  of  expressing-  the  same 
identical  fact  of  consciousness?  "I  am  morally  account- 
able." "  I  am  not  the  cause  of  my  volitions."  Are  these 
but  various  statements  of  the  same  fact  of  consciousness  ? 
Or  if  we  combine  the  two:  "  I  am  under  a  law  of  duty," 
and  "  I  am  morally  responsible,"  are  we  conscious  that 
the  sum  of  the  two  facts  thus  expressed  is  identical  withr 
and  only  another  manner  of  expressing,  the  fact  expressed 
in  the  proposition :  "lam  not  the  cause  of  my  volitions?" 
I  unhesitatingly  assume  that  no  man  will  answer  any  of 
these  questions  in  the  affirmative.  If  not,  then  the  fact 
that  we  are  free,  in  Sir  William's  sense  of  freedom,  is  not 
given  us  in  the  consciousness  of  those  other  facts,  in  the 
sense  of  being  identical  with  either  of  them,  or  with  the 
complement  of  the  two. 

Is   it    then  given  us  in  those  facts  of  consciousness,  in 
the  sense  that,  taking  them,  or  either  of  them,  as  premi- 
ses, it  can  be  deduced  as  a  conclusion?     If  this  was  Sir 
William's  meaning,  it  behooved   him  to  point  out  such 
connection  between  them  that  if  the  premises  be  admit- 
ted, the  conclusion  must.     But  he  has  not  attempted  this. 
Does  not  logic  lead  to  precisely  the  opposite  conclusion  ? 
If  /am  under  a  law  of  duty,  morally  bound  to  do  certain 
acts,    and    morally   responsible    for  doing   or  neglecting 
them,  does  it  not  follow  that  /  am  the  cause  of  the  voli- 
tions which  cause  or  prevent  these  acts  ?     I  submit  that  we 
never  hold  ourselves,  nor  each  other,  accountable  for  any 
action,  except  upon  the  supposition  that  the  person  thus 
held  accountable  was  the  cause  of  the  volition  which  pro- 
duced the  action.     We  sometimes  take  into  consideration 
the  outward  motives  which  concurred  with  the  disposition 
of  the  person,  and,  in  some  instances,  these  very  much  miti- 
gate the  praise  or  blame  to  which  we  consider  the  actor  en- 
titled.    We  hold  him  responsible  just  so  far  as  we  believe 
his  inward  disposition  to  have  been  the  cause  of  the  vo- 
lition, and  no  further. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  83 

Again,  we  never  hold  one  responsible  for  the  mere  per- 
formance of  a  deed.  If  one  shoots  another  and  thus 
destroys  his  life,  we  hold  him  quite  irresponsible,  if  it  be 
shown  that  he  did  not  know  that  the  person  was  in  the 
direction  of  the  shot,  or  that  the  motion  which  caused  the 
discharge  was  the  effect  of  a  nervous  affection,  or,  in  general, 
that  the  cause  of  the  homicide  was  not  the  volition  of 
the  slayer.  It  is  evident  from  this,  that  the  thing  for 
which  we  hold  one  responsible  is  not  the  outward  act,  but 
the  volition  which  causes  the  outward  act.  We  do  not, 
it  is  true,  ordinarily,  hold  men  responsible  for  mere  voli- 
tions which  are  never  put  forth  in  actions ;  but  I  suppose 
the  reason  is,  that  we  seldom  have  the  evidence  of  the 
volitions,  except  when  they  are  thus  put  forth.  But  that 
morally,  and  before  God,  we  are  accountable  for  the  vo- 
lition solely,  and  without  regard  to  its  connection  with 
anything  external,  the  Saviour  distinctly  teaches  in  Mat. 
5:  28. 

Now,  how  can  one  be  held  accountable  for  an  act  which 
his  hand  performs,  if  the  thing  that  caused  the  hand  to 
move  was  a  volition  of  which  he  was  not  the  cause?  If 
his  hand  was  moved  by  "  a  free  volition"  which  was  "  an 
absolute  commencement,"  it  was  the  mere  instrument  of 
that  volition,  and  I  see  not  why  he  should  be  held  more 
accountable  for  the  fact  that  a  volition  used  his  hand  than 
if  another  person  had  taken  hold  of  it  and  used  it.  If, 
then,  we  are  not  accountable  for  the  mere  actions  which 
our  hands  perform,  and  if  we  are  not  the  causes  of  the  vo- 
litions which  cause  our  hands  to  act,  then  upon  what 
ground  can  we  be  held  accountable  at  all  ? 

Will  Sir  W.  fall  back  on  the  evidence  of  consciousness, 
and  say  we  are  accountable  whether  we  can  explain  it  or 
not,  since  our  accountability  is  an  original  datum  of  con- 
sciousness ?  I  reply,  so  is  the  fact  that  we  are  the  causes 
of  our  volition  an  original  datum  of  consciousness. 
I  have  the  same  evidence  that  /  choose,  that  /  am  respon- 


84  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

sible,  and  that  /  exist,  viz.,  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness. And  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  whole  philosophy  is 
founded  upon  the  assumption  that  a  datum  of  conscious- 
ness is  the  highest  and  most  authoritative  form  of  evi- 
dence known  to  us,  the  foundation  of  all  reasoning,  and 
cannot  therefore  be  destroyed  by  reasoning. 

I  think  it  is  sufficiently  evident,  that  "  the /act  that  we 
are  free,"  in  the  sense  that  we  are  not  the  causes  of  our  voli- 
tions, but  that  they  are  "absolute  commencements,"  "is" 
not  "given  us  in  the  consciousness  of  an  uncompromising 
law  of  duty,  in  the  consciousness  of  our  moral  accounta- 
bility," either  in  the  sense  of  its  being  identical  with 
either  of  these  or  with  the  sum  of  the  two,  or  in  the  sense 
of  its  being  deducible  from  either  or  both. 

Perhaps,  I  have  trifled  with  the  patience  of  the  reader 
in  saying  so  much  upon  the  simple  fact  of  consciousness, 
that  we  are  the  causes  of  our  own  volitions.  If  so,  my 
only  apology  is,  that  it  was  denied,  or  seemed  to  be 
denied,  by  so  high  an  authority.  I  began  several  times 
to  write  a  criticism  upon  it,  and  several  times  abandoned 
what  I  had  written,  choosing  rather  to  distrust  my  own 
ability  to  understand  Sir  William,  than  to  impute  to  him 
an  opinion  which  involved  a  direct  contradiction  of  the 
first  principle  of  his  philosophy,  that  a  deliverance  of  con- 
sciousness is  to  be  received  as  unquestionably  true.  But 
a  thorough  re-examination  has  convinced  me  that  his  lan- 
guage can  mean  nothing  else  but  that  volitions  are 
uncaused.  Verily  "  nihil  tarn  absurde  dici  potest  quod  non 
dicatur  ab  aliquo  philosophorum." 

We  have  seen  what  Sir  William  makes  of  a  free  voli- 
tion. Let  us  inquire  what  he  makes  of  a  free  agent.  To 
make  his  definition  of  a  free  agent  consistent  with  that  of 
a  free  volition,  whatever  he  must  be,  he  must,  at  least,  not 
be  the  cause  of  volitions.  But  he  shall  speak  for  himself. 
"  We  are,  though  we  know  not  how,  the  true  and  respon- 
sible authors  of  our  actions,  nor  merely  the  worthless 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY    AND    PHILOSOPHY.  85 

links  in  an  adamantine  series  of  effects  and  causes."  If, 
in  the  term  actions,  he  includes  the  internal  volitions  as 
well  as  the  external  performances,  and  we  are  the  authors 
of  both,  are  those  volitions  then  absolute  commence- 
ments? If  we  are  their  authors,  then  they  are  either  de- 
termined by  motives,  or  they  are  not.  If  they  are,  then, 
according  to  Sir  William,  "  a  determination  by  motives 
cannot,  to  our  understanding,  escape  from  necessitation." 
If  they  are  not,  then  "a  motiveless  volition  would  be  only 
casualism." 

If  he  intended  the  statement,  "  that  we  are  the  true  and 
responsible  authors  of  our  actions,"  as  a  definition  of  a 
free  agent,  it  exactly  corresponds  with  the  first  one  I  gave 
above.  Whether  it  is  or  is  not  palpably  contradictory  to 
his  definition  of  a  free  volition,  the  reader  must  judge. 

Freedom  is  either  something  which  is  not  contradictory 
to  "  necessitation"  or  else  it  is  a  word  without  a  mean- 
ing. I  see  no  need  either  from  philosophy  or  from  any 
other  source,  to  seek  for  any  other  definition  of  liberty 
than  the  sense  in  which  it  is  ordinarily  used,  viz.,  the  un- 
interrupted causal  relation  between  our  volitions  and  our 
actions ;  and  this  of  course  on  the  supposition  that  we  are 
the  authors  of  our  volitions.  It  is  certain  that  philosophy 
has  not  established  and  cannot  establish  the  possibility  or 
the  conceivability  of  contingency  in  any  other  sense  than 
that  which  I  have  specified,  viz.,  such  as  is  expressed  by 
the  words,  if,  unless,  etc.  And  it  has  been  shown  that 
this  is  not  only  reconcilable  with  fixed  certainty,  which 
Mr.  Tappan  says  is  real  necessity,  but  that  it  is  only 
another  mode  of  expressing  certainty.  And  to  say  that, 
although  we  cannot  prove  the  actual  existence,  the  possi- 
bility or  even  the  conceivability,  of  any  other  sort  of  contin- 
gency, to  say  that  our  inability  is  no  evidence  that  there 
is  no  other  kind  of  contingency,  is  just  equivalent  to 
saying  something  may  exist  of  which  we  have  no  knowl- 
edge and  can  form  no  conception.     But  why  this  some- 


86  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

thing  should  have  the  name  of  contingency  or  any  other 
name  more  definite  than  merely  something,  I  know  not. 
It  is  true,  our  knowledge  is  not  the  measure  of  truth. 
Nor  is  conceivability  a  condition  of  our  belief.  I  fully 
agree  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  that  infinity  is,  to  us,  incon- 
ceivable. And  yet  there  is  no  rational  being  that  does  not 
believe  in  its  reality.  Why,  then,  do  we  believe  in  what 
we  cannot  conceive?  However  we  may  account  for  the 
origin  of  the  idea,  yet  whoever  wi'l  make  the  experiment 
will  find,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  that  he  can  neither 
take  in  the  idea  nor  can  he  shut  it  out  from  the  mind. 
(This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  the  proof  of  this.  Nor 
is  this  necessary  after  the  masterly  treatise  of  Hamilton.) 
But  we  are  not  thus  necessitated  to  admit  the  existence  of 
a  something,  of  whose  attributes  or  qualities  we  have  no 
idea,  of  a  something  whose  only  representative  is  a  word. 
I  would  observe  again,  that  Sir  W.'s  position  obliterates, 
not  the  existence  of  causality,  but  the  only  evidence  upon 
which  our  belief  of  that  existence  is  founded.  According 
to  him  (see  Dis.,  p.  575  et  seq.),  the  universal  judgment 
that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  arises  from  our  ina- 
bility to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement.  When  we 
observe  a  phenomenon,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  it  as 
springing  out  of  nothing,  as  an  absolute  commencement. 
We  are,  therefore,  he  says,  compelled  to  think  of  it  as 
springing  from  something  which  preceded  it  as  a  cause. 
This  mental  impote?ice  to  think  an  absolute  commence- 
ment is  the  source  and  foundation  of  our  belief  of  the  ex- 
istence of  causality.  And  this  inability  extends  to 
mental  as  well  as  to  physical  phenomena.  "  We  are  un- 
able to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement ;  we  cannot, 
therefore,  conceive  a  free  volition."  Here  then,  accord- 
ing to  him,  mental  and  physical  phenomena  stand  on  the 
same  ground.  We  cannot  conceive  one  of  either  class  as 
an  absolute  commencement.  And  this  inability  is  the 
source  of  our  belief  of  causality.     And  yet  he  insists  that 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  87 

the  belief  is  false  so  far  as  the  mental  phenomena  of  voli- 
tions are  concerned, — that  they  are  absolute  commence- 
ments, notwithstanding  our  inability  to  conceive  them  as 
such.  What  evidence  have  we,  then,  that  a  physical  phe- 
nomenon has  a  cause  ?  None  whatever,  according  to  Sir 
W.,  that  does  not  apply  with  equal  force  to  the  mental 
phenomena  of  volitions.  But  in  this  latter  instance,  he 
says  it  is  proved  by  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  be 
false.  Why,  then,  should  we  believe  it  to  be  true  in  re- 
gard to  physical  phenomena  ?  I  would  here  apply  one  of 
Sir.  W.'s  favorite  maxims :  falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omni- 
bus. If  a  witness  is  proved  to  have  testified  falsely  in  one 
instance,  we  cannot  trust  his  veracity  in  any  other. 

Now,  here  we  have  a  certain  kind  and  degree  of  evi- 
dence that  all  phenomena,  mental  and  physical,  have 
causes.  But  in  respect  to  the  mental,  this  evidence  is 
proved  false.  Why,  then,  should  we  hold  it  to  be  true  in 
respect  to  the  other  ? 

We  have,  then,  no  evidence  of  any  such  thing  as  causal- 
ism  in  the  universe.  It  may  exist.  But  we  cannot 
rationally  believe  in  its  existence,  because  we  have  no  evi- 
dence of  it,  except  what  has  been  proved  false  in  one  in- 
stance, and  is  therefore  not  reliable  in  any. 

Thus  all  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause,  and  finally  up 
to  the  great  First  Cause,  and  all  reasoning  from  cause  to 
effect  by  which  we  would  know  or  conjecture  future 
events,  all  such  reasoning  proceeds  upon  the  assumption 
of  a  relation  which,  so  far  as  we  know,  has  no  existence. 
Thus  all  things,  beings  and  events,  are  no  more  a  system, 
and  have  no  more  connection  with  each  other,  than  the 
grains  of  a  dry  sand-bank.  Each  being  and  each  event, 
for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  is  an  absolute  com- 
mencement, and,  since  it  has  no  more  relation  to  any- 
thing following  it  as  effect  than  to  anything  preceding  it 
as  cause,  each,  when  it  ceases  to  be,  is  an  absolute  termi- 
nation.    The  totality  of  things  would  then  be  a  system. 


88  ESSAYS— THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

according  to  the  etymology  of  the  word,  viz.,  things 
Standing  together,  for  they  would  stand  or  remain  in  jux- 
taposition as  grains  of  sand  do.  But  the  assemblage 
would  not  be  a  system  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  is 
now  universally  used,  viz.,  a  whole,  consisting  of  con- 
nected, adjusted  and  dependent  parts. 

Such  I  think  to  be  the  inevitable  conclusion  from  Sir 
William's  position  respecting  volitions.  I  deeply  regret 
that  he  is  not  living  that  he  might  correct  me,  if  in  any 
respect  I  have  misapprehended  his  meaning.  And  with 
unfeigned  diffidence  I  would  suggest  that  he  might  have 
modified  or  abandoned  his  position,  had  he  lived  to  see 
it  carried  out  to  its  necessary  consequences.  It  bears 
such  marks  of  haste  as  can  be  found  in  no  other  portion 
of  his  works.  Indeed,  he  indicates  that  his  thoughts  were 
not  fully  matured  on  the  subject.  "  Such,"  he  says,  (Disc. 
p.  587,)  "are  the  hints  of  an  undeveloped  philosophy, 
which,  I  am  confident,  is  founded  upon  truth."  I  venture 
to  believe  that  his  confidence  would  have  been  shaken, 
perhaps  renounced,  had  he  either  developed  it  or  seen  it 
developed. 

I  have  already  stated  that  the  fundamental  principle  of 
Hamilton's  Philosophy  is,  that  a  datum  of  consciousness 
is  the  highest  form  of  evidence  known  to  us,  and  therefore 
the  surest  ground  of  belief.  He  says,  {Philos.  p.  30)  "Al- 
though the  past  history  of  philosophy  has,  in  a  great 
measure,  been  only  a  history  of  variation  and  error, 
(variasse  erroris  est,)  yet  the  cause  of  this  variation  being 
known,  we  obtain  a  valid  ground  of  hope  for  the  destiny 
of  philosophy  in  future.  Because,  since  philosophy  has 
hitherto  been  inconsistent  with  itself,  only  in  being  in- 
consistent with  the  dictates  of  our  natural  beliefs — 
'  For  Truth  is  catholic  and  Nature  one  ;' 

it  follows,  that  philosophy  has  simply  to  return  to  natural 
consciousness,  to  return  to  unity  and  truth. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  89 

"In  doing  this  we  have  only  to  attend  to  the  three  fol- 
lowing maxims  or  precautions: 

"I.  That  we  admit  nothing  [which  is]  not  either  an  orig- 
inal datum  of  consciousness,  or  the  legitimate  conse- 
quence of  such  a  datum. 

"2.  That  we  embrace  all  the  original  data  of  conscious- 
ness, and  all  their  legitimate  consequences;  and 

"3.  That  we  exhibit  each  in  its  individual  integrity  nei- 
ther distorted  nor  mutilated,  and  in  its  relative  place, 
whether  of  pre-eminence  or  subordination." 

I  shall  follow  these  maxims  rigidly  in  the  present  in- 
stance.    What  does  consciousness  teach  on  this  subject? 

1.  That  our  volitions  are  produced  or  caused  by  the 
correlation  between  our  dispositions  or  constitutions,  (in 
which  must  be  reckoned  the  physical,  intellectual  and 
moral  faculties),  and  external  circumstances,  e.  g.\  The 
volition  to  eat  a  certain  article  of  food  springs  from  the 
physical  appetite,  the  intellectual  inclination  of  curiosity 
to  know  what  its  taste,  or  its  effect  upon  ourselves,  may 
be,  or  from  some  moral  consideration,  as  a  Christian  par- 
takes of  the  Lord's  supper, — from  some  one  of  these,  and 
the  opportunity,  real  or  supposed,  of  gratifying  the  inter- 
nal desire.  Let  any  one  attempt  to  form  a  volition  to  eat 
an  apple,  for  instance,  when  there  is  no  prospect  of  obtain- 
ing one.  Although  consciousness  may  testify  that  he  has 
the  desire,  it  will  also  testify  to  his  inability  to  put  that 
desire  into  the  form  of  a  volition.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is,  of  course,  impossible  for  the  mere  opportunity  of  ob- 
taining an  object  to  produce  the  volition  to  do  so,  inde- 
pendently of  any  correspondence  between  that  object  and 
an  internal  desire.  Every  one's  consciousness  assures 
him  of  this  compound  cause  of  the  phenomenon  which 
we  call  volition.  I  have  already  quoted  the  testimony  of 
Dugald  Stewart  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton  to  the  same  effect. 

2.  Consciousness  assures  us  that  our  volitions  are  the 
causes  of  our  actions.     One  is  conscious   that   his  hand 


OX)  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

rises,  and  the  same  act  of  consciousness  assures  him  that 
it  rises  because  he  wills  or  determines  that  it  shall  rise. 
Of  this  causal  relation  he  has  the  highest  evidence  known 
to  man,  the  testimony  of  consciousness. 

3.  We  have  "  the  consciousness  of  an  uncompromising 
law  of  duty,"  i.  e.,  that  we  ought  to  do  certain  things,  and 
to  refrain  from  doing  others,  e.  g.,  to  speak  the  truth  and 
refrain  from  lying. 

4.  We  are  conscious  of  having  the  ability  to  do  the  one 
and  refrain  from  the  other, — the  physical  ability  to  speak, 
the  intellectual  ability  to  distinguish  between  truth  and 
falsehood,  and  the  moral  perception  of  our  duty  in 
regard  to  each.  We  are  conscious  that  these  powers  lie 
dormant  until  they  are  set  in  motion  by  a  volition,  i.  <?., 
we  are  conscious  that  we  can  speak  the  one  or  the  other, 
if  we  choose  to  do  so. 

5.  Consciousness  assures  us  of  our  moral  responsibility. 
To  some  this  may  seem  identical  with  No.  3.  To  me  the 
two  propositions,  "  we  ought  to  do  a  certain  act,"  and 
"we  are  responsible  for  doing  or  neglecting,"  seem  mu- 
tually to  involve  or  imply  each  other,  but  to  be  distin- 
guishable from  each  other,  as  father  and  son.  But  if  any 
insist  that  they  are  only  different  statements  of  the  same 
fact,  I  shall  not  contend  for  the  distinction.  In  stating 
them  separately  I  am  certain  of  including  all  the  facts  of 
consciousness  with  which  my  present  subject  is  connected, 
and  I  would  rather  repeat  than  omit  one  of  them. 

6.  The  consciousness  of  our  moral  accountability  either 
implies  or  includes  (I  shall  leave  the  reader  to  determine 
which)  the  existence  of  a  moral  Ruler,  to  whom  we  are 
responsible.  As  causality  is  a  relation  between  two  things 
which  we  call  cause  and  effect,  and  the  conception  of  it 
cannot  exist  without  these  other  two  conceptions  upon 
which  it  is  founded,  so  responsibility  is  a  correlation 
between  two  beings  standing  to  each  other  in  the  rela- 
tion   of    obligor   and    obligee.     "  I    ought    to    keep  my 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  91 

word,"  means  "  I  owe  to  keep  my  word."  If  I  owe  it,  I 
owe  it  to  some  being.  Who  is  that  being?  It  is  mani- 
festly no  human  tribunal,  either  individual  or  collective: 
for  in  that  case,  the  death  of  the  individual,  or  the  sub- 
version of  the  government  or  society,  to  whom  I  was 
bound,  would  release  me  from  the  obligation.  But  the 
consciousness  of  the  obligation  is  universal  and  perpetual, 
neither  ceasing  nor  changing  with  the  extinction  of  indi- 
viduals or  societies.  These  individuals  and  these  socie- 
ties themselves,  however  exalted,  are  all  under  the  same 
law,  and  owe  the  same  obligation  to  its  Legislator.  I 
shall  not  undertake  to  decide  how  much  we  can  legiti- 
mately infer  from  this  source  concerning  the  "  One  Law- 
giver." I  only  say  that  our  consciousness  of  moral  ac- 
countability proves,  whether  by  implication  or  inclusion, 
though  I  think  the  latter,  the  existence  of  a  moral  Ruler 
to  whom  we  owe  obedience. 

I  think  of  no  other  deliverance  of  consciousness  bear- 
ing on  this  subject.  Whether  "  the  fact  that  we  are  free," 
in  the  sense  that  neither  we  nor  any  other  being  or  thing 
causes  our  volitions,  "is  given  to  us"  as  being  identical 
with  any  one  of  these,  or  with  the  sum  of  several,  or  with 
the  complement  of  them  all,  or  as  being  deducible  from 
any  one,  or  several,  or  all,  of  them,  the  reader  must  judge. 

"  Truth,  indeed,  came  once  into  the  world  with  her 
Divine  Master,  and  was  a  perfect  shape,  most  glorious  to 
look  on  ;  but  when  He  ascended,  and  His  apostles  after 
Him  were  laid  asleep,  then  straight  arose  a  wicked  race  of 
deceivers,  who,  as  the  story  goes  of  the  Egyptian  Typhon 
with  his  conspirators,  how  they  dealt  with  the  god  Osiris, 
took  the  virgin  Truth,  hewed  her  lovely  form  into  a  thou- 
sand pieces  and  scattered  them  to  the  four  winds.  From 
that  time  ever  since,  the  sad  friends  of  Truth,  such  as 
durst  appear,  imitating  the  careful  search  that  Isis  made 
for  the  mangled  body  of  Osiris,  went  up  and  down  gather- 
ing up  limb  by  limb,  still  as  they  could  find  them.     We 


92  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

have  not  yet  found  them  all,  Lords  and  Commons !  nor 
ever  shall  do,  till  at  her  Master's  second  coming  He  shall 
bring  together  every  joint  and  member,  and  mould  them 
into  an  immortal  feature  of  loveliness  and  perfection." — 
M  i  LTON. 

Believing  that  I  have  found  a  few  fragments  of  this 
mangled  body,  I  have  added  them  to  the  collection  al- 
ready made. 


ESSAYS — THEOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY.  93 


ESSAY  FIFTH.— THE  MORAL  LAW. 


Dr.  Wayland  says :  '■  By  the  term  law,  I  think,  we 
generally  mean  a  form  of  expression,  denoting  either  a 
mode  of  existence,  or  an  order  of  sequence 

"Of  the  same  nature  are  the  laws  of  Chemistry.  Such, 
for  instance,  is  the  law  that,  if  soda  be  saturated  with 
muriatic  acid,  the  result  will  be  common  salt 

"A  moral  law,  is,  therefore,  a  form  of  expression  de- 
noting an  established  order  of  sequence  established  be- 
tween the  moral  quality  of  actions,  and  their  results." — 
Elements  of  Moral  Science,  pp.  23,  24. 

This  definition  is  correct,  but  very  defective.  If  this 
were  the  whole  of  the  Moral  Law,  sin  would  be  an  impos- 
sibility. A  violation  of  the  law  of  Chemistry,  above  spe- 
cified, is  of  course  impossible.  But  "  sin  is  the  transgres- 
sion of  the  law."  Then  there  must  be  something  in  it 
that  can  be  transgressed. 

The  Moral  Law  consists  of  two  elements,  the  sequen- 
tial, "Do  this  and  live,"  "The  soul  that  sinneth,  it  shall 
die,"  and  the  preceptive,  "  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy 
,God     .       .     and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

Our  first  parents  tried  to  separate  these  two  things 
which  God  hath  joined  together,  "In  the  day  thou  eatest 
thereof  thou  shalt  surely  die,"  and  their  posterity  yet  be- 
lieve the  Father  of  lies,  who  said  :  "  Ye  shall  not  surely 
die."  But  not  one  has  ever  broken  this  portion  of  the 
Moral  Law. 

Has  it  ever  been  broken  ? 

Yes.  The  one  Law-giver  who  repeatedly  set  aside  the 
order  of  sequence  in  the  physical  world,  has  said:  "  He 
that  believeth  and  is  baptized  shall  be  saved."     And  mil- 


94  ESSAYS — THEOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

lions,  whom  the  moral  order  of  sequence  would  have  car- 
ried to  perdition  as  certainly  as  water  drowns  fire,  are  now 
rejoicing  that  a  way  has  been  found  by  which  "  He  can  be 
just  and  the  Justifier  of  him  that  believeth  in  Jesus." 
The  salvation  of  a  sinner  is  a  greater  miracle  than  the 
raising  of  Lazarus.  That  was  simply  an  inexpensive  re- 
versing of  the  law  that  would  have  carried  him  to  corrup- 
tion. The  law,  or  order  of  sequence,  "  The  soul  that 
sinneth,  it  shall  die,"  could  not  be  reversed  except  by 
some  means  which  should  "  magnify  the  law  and  make  it 
honorable." 

The  reader,  of  course,  knows  the  "  great  Ransom  "  that 
made  this  possible. 

I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  great  obligation  to  my  breth- 
ren, Revs.  W.  J.  Snider  and  J.  F.  Buist. 


[From  the  Christian  Index.] 

A  VALUABLE  WORK, 


The  "  Essays  in  Theology  and  Philosophy,"  by  Dr.  W. 
H.  Carson,  are  now  passing  through  the  press  of  J.  P.  Har- 
rison &  Co.  I  have  had  opportunity  and  occasion  to  read 
several  of  them.  They  have  impressed  me  as  characterized 
in  no  small  degree  by  clearness  of  thought,  force  of  rea- 
soning, and  precision  of  style.  The  author  grapples — by 
way,  not  of  dissertation,  merely,  but  of  discussion — with 
lofty  and  difficult  themes ;  such  as  "  certainty  and  con- 
tingency," "providence,"  "prayer,"  "human  liberty,  and 
efficient  Divine  government,"  etc.  And  without  commit- 
ting myself  to  all  his  positions  and  processes,  I  feel  free  to 
express  the  hope  that  many  readers  of  THE  INDEX  will  do 
these  high  subjects  the  justice  of  acquainting  themselves 
with  this  able  attempt  to  solve  the  perplexities  with  which 
hasty  and  partial  thinking  often  darkens  the  truth. 

D.  Shaver. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  February  22,  1881. 


I  have  read  a  portion  of  the  proof-sheets  of  Dr.  W.  B. 

Carson's    forthcoming  publication.     I   think    the  Doctor 

has  handled  with  madced  ability  the  profound  topics  he 

discusses. 

P.  H.  Mell. 


Sollir^   I:q$titute, 

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